The South Caucasus has gradually evolved from a peripheral neighborhood into a strategic geopolitical gateway for Türkiye, since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Türkiye was among the first states to recognize the independence of the three South Caucasus countries—Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia—immediately following their declarations of independence. Beyond its deeply rooted historical and ethno-cultural ties with the region, the South Caucasus holds critical importance for Türkiye due to its geographic proximity, its role in energy transit corridors, and its broader geopolitical significance within the context of regional power competition and strategic balancing vis-à-vis Russia and Iran.
Türkiye’s foreign policy toward the region has largely been shaped by a preference for bilateral engagement with each country, rather than by a comprehensive, long-term regional strategy. While the early phase of Türkiye’s foreign policy toward the South Caucasus was characterized by cautious engagement, shaped by strategic constraints and Russian regional dominance, Türkiye became increasingly active in the region during the 2000s. Türkiye has positioned itself at the center of a critical geoeconomic corridor linking the Caspian basin with global markets through the implementation of major energy and transportation projects such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway (BTK), the Baku–Tbilisi–Erzurum natural gas pipeline, the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline (BTC), the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). In doing so, it has consolidated its role as an energy, trade gateway and an energy hub to Europe.
Since 2016, Türkiye has increasingly embraced a more realpolitik-oriented foreign policy, guided by the doctrine of “strategic autonomy.” Within this framework, Türkiye’s earlier economically oriented regional policy evolved into a more assertive, security-centered, and geopolitically proactive strategy. Drawing from a neoclassical realist perspective, Türkiye’s foreign policy toward the South Caucasus reflects the dynamic interaction between systemic pressures and domestic intervening variables. While the regional power competition—particularly involving Russia, the United States, the European Union, and Iran—has shaped the strategic environment in which Türkiye operates at the systemic level, leadership perceptions, strategic culture, and identity narratives have influenced how Turkish policymakers interpret these systemic pressures at the domestic level.
For instance, the 2020 Second Karabakh War significantly changed the regional balance of power and opened new space for Türkiye to expand its political, military, and diplomatic role in the South Caucasus. At the systemic level, Russia’s weakening dominance in the region, the EU’s growing interest in connectivity and energy diversification, the United States’ support for Armenia–Azerbaijan normalization, all created a complex strategic environment for Ankara. At the domestic level, Türkiye’s leadership narratives—emphasizing regional leadership, strategic autonomy, and historical-cultural responsibility toward the Turkic world—encourage a more assertive policy. Yet these narratives must be balanced against economic limitations, the need to maintain pragmatic relations with Russia and Iran, and the risks of overextension. All these external and internal factors both constrain and enable Ankara’s regional engagement, while simultaneously informing its broader foreign policy aspirations in the South Caucasus.
Azerbaijan occupies a central position in Türkiye’s South Caucasus strategy. The relationship between the two countries is often described by the phrase “one nation, two states,” reflecting deep cultural, linguistic, and historical ties. Following the Second Karabakh War in 2020, Türkiye and Azerbaijan signed the Shusha Declaration in 2021, which further strengthened their strategic partnership and expanded cooperation in defense, economic, and diplomatic fields. The declaration symbolized the consolidation of the Türkiye–Azerbaijan alliance and underscored Türkiye’s growing role as a regional security actor. Through defense-industrial cooperation, military training, joint exercises, and the transfer of operational knowledge, Türkiye contributed to the modernization of Azerbaijan’s armed forces and enhanced their ability to conduct more flexible, technology-driven operations. The most visible manifestation of this support was Azerbaijan’s use of Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 armed drones during the Second Karabakh War.
Georgia constitutes a key strategic partner for Türkiye, since both countries maintain a strong partnership characterized by high-level diplomatic ties, growing trade, and critical energy/transport cooperation. Türkiye also supports Georgia’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Reflecting the depth of bilateral economic ties, Türkiye ranked first among Georgia’s trading partners in 2025, with total trade reaching approximately USD 3.1 billion, accounting for nearly 12% of Georgia’s overall foreign trade volume. Alongside flagship energy projects such as the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, the recently modernized Baku–Tbilisi–Kars (BTK) railway occupies a central position in linking Ankara, Tbilisi, and Baku. For Ankara, Georgia is not merely a neighboring state, but a geopolitical bridge that connects Türkiye to Azerbaijan, the Caspian basin, and Central Asia without passing through either Russia or Iran. This makes Georgia central to Türkiye’s regional connectivity vision, which links China and Central Asia to Europe through the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye.
Although relations between Türkiye and Armenia have historically been strained by the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and long-standing disputes rooted in historical grievances, post-2020 regional dynamics suggest a potential shift toward gradual normalization. Since 2021, both countries have appointed special envoys, and limited confidence-building measures have been introduced. In 2025, Turkish Airlines launched direct flights between Istanbul and Yerevan, marking a further symbolic step in the normalization process. In addition, Türkiye and Armenia declared their intention to simplify visa procedures for holders of diplomatic, special, and service passports. While Ankara continues to link full normalization with progress in the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process, the normalization of Türkiye–Armenia relations remain critically important not only for bilateral ties, but also for the future political and economic configuration of the South Caucasus.
Today, Türkiye seeks to strengthen its geopolitical posture by positioning itself as a central node in emerging east–west connectivity networks that link Europe with the South Caucasus, the Caspian basin, Central Asia, and China. By strengthening East–West connectivity, its regional strategy prioritizes strategic partnerships, economic integration, and diplomatic engagement aimed at fostering regional stability amid an increasingly complex geopolitical environment. In line with its long-term strategic vision, Ankara combines economic pragmatism with geopolitical positioning, while the South Caucasus is likely to continue to maintain its strategic significance in Türkiye’s broader foreign policy agenda, reinforcing its role as an increasingly assertive regional power.