Global energy security is undergoing significant structural change driven by geopolitical fragmentation, conflict, and technological disruption. Recent crises, primarily the US-Israeli escalation in Iran and the subsequent closure of the Strait of Hormuz; the continued pressures caused by the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine; and, the incessant demand for resources required by the AI technological revolution, have demonstrated the extent of resource scarcity, but also of the systemic infrastructural fragility of the energy market. Traditional assumptions that interdependence reducing the probability of conflict may still stand, but the vulnerabilities inherent in a globalised energy market are perhaps more visible than ever. In my recent interview with Rauf Mammadov, we discussed how energy security is not solely about where energy comes from, but whether it can move at all.
The Myth of Linear Interdependence
Liberal theorists have argued that as countries intertwine economically, the costs of war would become prohibitively high giving states the rational incentive to avoid conflict. As the energy market has globalised, creating a sprawling network of consumers, producers, transit states and global financial institutions, this network of mutual dependencies should create a shared interest in maintaining peace and stability. Recent geopolitical events however have challenged this assumption. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 made stark the Russian prioritisation of its geopolitical and strategic interests over economic rationality. Moscow accepted enormous economic costs whilst Europe was forced to re-evaluate the structure of its energy systems. Similarly, the recent escalation by the US and Israel in Iran also demonstrates that political goals, however ambiguous they may seem, can outweigh the certainty of economic stability. National security concerns, domestic politics and geopolitical ambitions can override the strategic incentive provided by energy interdependence to avoid peace.
The energy market’s creation of interdependence also creates leverage. States can exert pressure and pursue strategic objectives through the weaponisation of not only the resource itself, but its transport network. Energy infrastructure, supply chains, maritime chokepoints, and technological dependencies, are all instruments of statecraft and coercion. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz – which carries one-fifth of the world’s oil supply – demonstrates this clearly. Iran does not need to dominate global oil production or commodification it simply needs to threaten a critical transport route to gain significant strategic leverage.
Chokepoints
Three maritime chokepoints sit at the centre of the global economy: the Strait of Hormuz, through which a large share of the world’s oil passes; the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, linking the Indian Ocean to the Suez Canal; and the Strait of Malacca, a vital route connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans, particularly for East Asian economies. These narrow passages concentrate global trade and energy flows into a handful of vulnerable locations, making them critical sources of geopolitical leverage. States that can protect—or threaten to disrupt—these routes gain significant strategic influence.
Increasingly, chokepoints have shifted from being instruments of great-power naval dominance to tools of asymmetric warfare. States and non-state actors that lack conventional military strength can nevertheless impose substantial economic costs by threatening global shipping. In today’s interconnected world, strategic influence no longer depends solely on naval supremacy; the credible ability to disrupt key trade routes can itself become a powerful source of geopolitical leverage.
Energy as Infrastructure Diplomacy
However, in my recent interview with Rauf Mammadov, he discussed how energy infrastructure is dual-use. It can be both weaponised in conflict or used as a stabiliser. He argues that Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz potentially deterred full-scale aggression from the US and Israel and ensured the prospect of diplomatic talks. The use of so-called “peace pipelines” offer another example of how interdependence between rivalling states can embed political relationships within material flows. The Middle Corridor and revitalised talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan suggest energy markets can be decoupled from geopolitical antagonisms. Rather than eliminating tensions, energy interdependence can be used to reduce the probability of conflict which can often be managed through structured diplomacy. It cannot eliminate the prospect of war, but energy and its infrastructure can help to constrain further escalation when the threat of mutual damage is made severe.
Resilience and Access
In 2022, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, European dependency on Russian gas was laid bare and diversification efforts were promised. Four years later and those efforts were seemingly only partial. The problem Europe must grapple with is their confusion between decentralisation and sovereignty. Decentralisation is a significant priority both for the European public and their governments. The demand for a structural shift to renewables is large, and is often conflated with energy independence. Yet, renewables still depend on global supply chains and an interconnected electricity grid for greater efficiency. The pursuit of renewables redistributes vulnerabilities, rather than eradicates them. Similarly, sovereignty is framed as self-sufficiency, but most European states do not have the capacity for self-sufficiency – particularly if its renewable. Rauf, and many other experts, posit that neither is absolutely necessary. States can thrive more effectively with a more diverse network of energy supplies which include fossil fuels, perhaps nuclear, solar, wind, and other renewables. Energy security requires diversification of both energy sources and supply routes.
China is a pivotal example of a state seeking resilience through diversification rather than autarky. China remains the world’s largest carbon emitter but also its biggest producer of renewable energy [1] China also had the largest stockpile of crude oil at the beginning of the US-Israeli war in Iran [2]. According to the IEA, between 2019 and 2024, China will account for 40 percent of global renewable capacity expansion and is also set to lead global growth in biofuel production [3]. It’s diversification of energy resources is coupled with a diversification of suppliers and transit routes. It’s infamous Belt and Road Initiative has expanded pipelines, ports and transport links across Eurasia; its Power of Siberia pipeline imports natural gas directly from Russia over land; and, the China-Myanmar Oil and Gas Pipelines pass through the Strait of Malacca. The success of China in navigating recent geopolitical crises comes not by pursuing self-sufficiency, but in both diversification of energy supplies and transport routes. Spreading the risk across multiple partners and technologies creates systemic resilience.
Concluding Thoughts
The vulnerabilities inherent in the interdependence of the global energy market have been laid bare with recent geopolitical crises. As states continue to pursue political ambitions at the expense of economic stability, others who are left vulnerable to the consequent economic shocks should prioritise four key strategies. Firstly, diversification of supply sources which would reduce exposure to any single producer. Secondly, diversification of transit routes to avoid geopolitical shocks caused by asymmetric warfare. Thirdly, investment in storage capacity, including strategic resolves and grid-scale electricity storage to smooth periods of volatility. Fourthly, to continue to pursue energy interdependence. It might create additional vulnerabilities, but it also provides opportunities for peace, as seen in the South Caucasus. Energy security in the twenty-first century is not solely defined by who controls resources, but by who can absorb and withstand disruption.
For the full interview with Rauf Mammadov: Global Energy Dynamic – A discussion with Rauf Mammadov
[1] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/feb/13/china-coal-power-energy-production-quotas
[2] https://knowledge.energyinst.org/new-energy-world/article?id=140279