Recent shifts in United States foreign policy under the second Trump Administration have contributed to a broader set of geopolitical changes reshaping regional stability. These shifts have varied in impact and success, depending on the Administration’s perceived interest and level of planning. In the South Caucasus, long-standing dynamics are undergoing accelerated transformation. Armenia and Azerbaijan have articulated a shared intent to negotiate a durable peace agreement. Armenia and Türkiye have increased the frequency and formality of diplomatic engagement. The United States has also demonstrated renewed strategic focus through support for implementing the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP).
Recent developments have further institutionalized the TRIPP initiative beyond its initial diplomatic announcement. In January 2026, the United States and Armenia released an implementation framework outlining concrete steps for advancing regional connectivity, infrastructure development, and economic diversification through the proposed regional network. This was followed in February 2026 by U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance’s visit to Yerevan and Baku, during which Washington concluded a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with Armenia and signed a strategic partnership charter with Azerbaijan. These initiatives indicate that TRIPP is evolving into a broader framework linking energy cooperation, trade routes, and regional economic integration rather than remaining a narrowly defined transport project.1 In practice, TRIPP increasingly operates as a coordinating platform linking energy cooperation, trade routes, and regional economic integration.
These developments are unfolding amid a broader erosion of Russian influence, and more recently, amidst serious global shocks in the Persian Gulf. Armenia has intensified its political and security realignment toward Europe, while Azerbaijan has adopted a more assertive posture toward limiting Russian interference, and Türkiye has expanded its role as a consequential strategic actor spanning the South Caucasus and Central Asia. At the same time, Washington’s growing emphasis on connectivity, especially via the emerging Middle Corridor, reflects a larger effort to encourage diversification away from Russian-controlled economic and security structures. Russia’s war in Ukraine has also created a temporary geopolitical window in which South Caucasus states possess greater freedom to reshape their foreign policies before Moscow’s regional influence potentially stabilizes or reasserts itself.
Realizing a coherent and sustainable regional framework depends on aligning several interdependent conditions. While each step reflects long-term national interests of the region’s principal stakeholders, their fulfillment requires sustained political commitment, pragmatic sequencing, and a shared recognition of the advantages of interdependence. As such, a realistic roadmap is needed for how such an architecture can emerge, the conditions for its consolidation, and the associated timelines, opportunities, and risks inherent in this process. This piece argues that connectivity in the South Caucasus is not merely an economic project, but an organizing principle of an emerging regional order.
Setting the Regional Table
Russian Influence
Armenia’s June 2026 parliamentary elections are expected to draw significant Russian hybrid interference, mirroring the tactics deployed in Moldova.2 For more than two centuries, Russia has viewed the South Caucasus as a core buffer and transit zone linking Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia. During both the imperial and Soviet periods, Moscow entrenched military, economic, and political control across Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, establishing infrastructure networks and institutional frameworks that persisted after 1991.3 In the post-Soviet era, Russia retained significant influence through forward military basing, energy sector penetration, and regional organizations such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Council of Independent States (CIS), and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). The present erosion of Russian influence, therefore, represents a major structural shift in the regional order, rather than a transient political fluctuation.4 These developments have intensified debates about Armenia’s institutional resilience and options for reducing structural reliance on Moscow, particularly as Yerevan moves closer to Europe.
Türkiye, Azerbaijan and Armenia
Armenia and Azerbaijan have lacked diplomatic relations since the late-Soviet period, stemming from the escalation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which resulted in large-scale displacement, contested borders, and two major wars. This decades-long confrontation entrenched mutually exclusive security narratives and hardened political mistrust.5 The absence of a comprehensive settlement has prevented transit infrastructure development, inhibited economic diversification, and maintained a persistent risk of renewed conflict.6 Normalization is, therefore, essential not only for peace but for unlocking the region’s core transit potential.
Armenia-Türkiye relations have remained frozen since 1993, when Türkiye closed its land border in response to the First Karabakh War. Relations are additionally shaped by the unresolved legacy of the 1915 Armenian Genocide, which continues to influence public sentiment, diaspora politics, and Ankara’s approach to historical acknowledgment.7 Despite these sensitivities, both governments have increasingly recognized that controlled, phased normalization could generate significant economic and strategic benefits. As such, temporary de-prioritization of genocide-related issues functions as a tactical sequencing decision rather than a normative concession.
Sequencing and Order
Within this context, the sequencing of Armenia-Azerbaijan and Armenia-Türkiye normalization is central. Nagorno-Karabakh has been the main dispute shaping Armenia-Azerbaijan relations since the late 1980s, generating protracted conflict, entrenched narratives of territorial entitlement, and cycles of military escalation.8 Azerbaijan’s 2023 re-establishment of control of the region fundamentally altered the conflict’s legal and political landscape, de-facto resolving the territorial issue, but leaving unresolved questions about constitutional language, border demarcation, and post-conflict rights.9 This dynamic explains why Baku links peace negotiations to constitutional amendments and why Yerevan views such demands as politically unfeasible. Sequencing matters because Türkiye has consistently aligned its normalization process with Azerbaijani strategic preferences. In practical terms, major progress on the Armenia-Türkiye track is unlikely to be fully consolidated absent visible movement between Yerevan and Baku. For Armenia, this creates a dual-track diplomatic challenge: progress with Türkiye can unlock diversification benefits, but progress with Azerbaijan remains necessary to sustain them.
Although it appears strategically sound for Armenia to normalize relations with Türkiye first, Ankara maintains that durable progress should proceed in parallel with or follow movement on the Azerbaijani track.10 This reflects Türkiye’s longstanding strategic alignment with Baku and its preference that regional normalization emerge through complementary, rather than competing tracks.
Armenia’s economic dependence on Russia is rooted in the immediate post-Soviet period, when Moscow acquired major stakes in Armenia’s gas distribution system, electricity grid, and nuclear fuel supply in exchange for debt forgiveness and security guarantees. As a result, Russia today supplies nearly 90 percent of Armenia’s natural gas, maintains deep ownership across critical energy assets, and remains the dominant source of wheat and basic commodities. This dependency affords Moscow substantial leverage over Armenia’s domestic stability and foreign policy options.11 Any sustainable realignment toward Europe, and any viable regional order, therefore requires diversification away from this entrenched economic reliance.
Near-Term Opportunities
By autumn 2025, three potential scenarios had emerged that might offer a rare window to clarify expectations and secure initial steps for Armenia and Türkiye.12 These included: 1) opening the border for diplomatic passport holders; 2) expanding this to third-country nationals; or 3) full normalization. In private diplomatic discussions, Turkish officials have signaled that the second option is the most feasible. One of these steps came to fruition in December 2025, when the two countries agreed to simplify visa procedures, including free electronic visas for holders of diplomatic, special, and service passports.13 Coming into force on January 1, 2026, this represented meaningful operational progress and a genuine desire by both sides to move toward normalization. Discussions over border reopening have only intensified since then, with flight resumption, visa agreements, and land trade underpinning these aspirations.
Yerevan’s hosting of the May 2026 European Political Community Summit provided a potential venue for advancing regional engagement, though its outcomes were more modest than initially anticipated. President Erdoğan did not attend, with Türkiye instead represented by Vice President Cevdet Yılmaz, while President Aliyev addressed the summit by video rather than in person. This limited the scope for direct trilateral interaction at the highest level.14 Nevertheless, the summit still reflected continued diplomatic movement: Türkiye maintained senior representation in Yerevan – the first time since 2013 – and Aliyev’s remarks reaffirmed Azerbaijan’s commitment to the peace process and acknowledged the broader benefits of regional stability.15 In this sense, while the summit did not fully realize its potential as a catalytic moment, it nevertheless illustrated the incremental and carefully calibrated nature of the normalization process.
Taken together, these developments suggest that progress continues, though at a more measured pace than earlier diplomatic momentum may have implied.
Steps Toward Regional Integration
The South Caucasus occupies a pivotal geostrategic position as a connective bridge between Europe and Asia. Its stability and integration are central to developing the Middle Corridor – a growing alternative to Russian transit networks that supports diversified trade, energy routes, and regional resilience. However, the benefits of integration depend on the near-simultaneous advancement of several interdependent processes: Armenia-Türkiye normalization, an Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement, and cross-border infrastructure development. If these processes advance in isolation or at uneven speeds, progress risks being reversed. If aligned, they can transform the South Caucasus into a stable and economically dynamic corridor linking Europe with Central Asia and beyond.
Diplomatic Normalization with Türkiye
One essential diplomatic pillar of this architecture is normalization between Armenia and Türkiye. Türkiye is the most consequential regional actor capable of shaping the South Caucasus’s future connective infrastructure. Ankara’s security and economic initiatives align strongly with a stable, interconnected South Caucasus in which Armenia is a sovereign, constructive participant. Even modest initial steps like partial border openings, limited cross-border movement, and reactivation of diplomatic channels would operationalize a normalization process that has remained stalled for decades. Gradual implementation can pave the way for full diplomatic relations, expanded trade, and deeper integration in regional transit networks.
The normalization process has already begun to move from symbolic diplomacy. The December 2025 visa liberalization measures and ongoing discussions regarding the Gyumri-Kars railway indicate gradual progress toward practical confidence-building measures. Parallel discussions have also expanded to include the possible reopening of rail transit links, which would restore a historic cross-border corridor connecting Armenia directly to Türkiye and the wider Middle Corridor. While these steps remain incremental, they signal a gradual shift from exploratory dialogue toward practical confidence-building.16 Recent analysis suggests that any eventual border reopening is likely to occur in phased stages – beginning with limited commercial, technical, or third-country access arrangements before full bilateral normalization – further underscoring the incremental nature of the current process.17
For Armenia, temporarily reducing the prominence of genocide-related issues in negotiations does not diminish their historical or moral weight. Instead, it reflects strategic prioritization: economic diversification, sovereignty consolidation, and reduced dependence on Russia. Public opinion in both countries is mixed, but an expanding constituency recognizes the practical benefits of normalization, including employment opportunities, market expansion, and long-term stability.18
For Ankara, the corridor reinforces Türkiye’s ambition to serve as the primary logistical bridge between Europe and Asia. Economically, Türkiye, working in tandem with its Central Asian partners, can meaningfully reduce Armenia’s acute reliance on Russian wheat and essential goods. Consolidated grain import, new trade routes, and diversified supply chains would enhance Armenian sovereignty and complement broader regional integration.19 Therefore, diplomatic normalization with Türkiye is not only a diplomatic step but an essential structural component of Armenia’s long-term security and economic independence. This calibrated approach was also evident during the European Political Community Summit in Yerevan, where Türkiye’s decision to send its Vice President, rather than the President, reflected a continued willingness to engage, while maintaining alignment with the broader sequencing of the normalization process.
Finalize the Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Agreement
A lasting peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan constitutes the second prerequisite for regional connectivity, following the August 8 Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and Interstate Relations,20 along with subsequent visits to the region by senior U.S. officials. Remaining obstacles now lie less in the absence of declared political intent than in politically sensitive constitutional, legal, and technical disputes that require pragmatic negotiation.
Azerbaijan’s expectation that Armenia amends its constitution to remove perceived territorial implications – despite no explicit references to Karabakh – poses the most difficult challenge. Constitutional reform is politically unrealistic in the near term. As such, progress requires Baku to recalibrate or sequence this demand more pragmatically.21 What is essential is mutual recognition of territorial integrity and a binding commitment against future territorial claims or support for separatism. Border delimitation and demarcation remain technically complex, but politically manageable if resourced and insulated from rhetorical escalation.22 Humanitarian issues, such as detainee exchanges and the proposed “right of return” for former Azerbaijani residents, can be addressed in phased or compartmentalized formats that do not impede the core agreement.23
Recent developments also demonstrate that the transition from diplomatic agreement to post-conflict implementation remains politically sensitive. In early 2026, Azerbaijani courts issued sentences against several former Karabakh Armenian officials. These proceedings have generated strong reactions within Armenia and among diaspora communities, illustrating how unresolved humanitarian and legal questions continue to shape public perceptions of the peace process. While such developments do not necessarily derail negotiations, they underscore the importance of carefully sequencing political agreements alongside mechanisms capable of addressing post-conflict grievances.24
With all these considerations in mind, a peace settlement grounded in economic interdependence offers the most significant benefits. Armenian access to Azerbaijani energy, electricity, and transit infrastructure, facilitated by TRIPP, would reduce Russian leverage and mitigate geographic isolation.25 With necessary upgrades, Azerbaijani gas and electricity could gradually diversify Armenia’s energy sources, while Armenia could export hydropower in return.26 Though Azerbaijan cannot replace Russia across all sectors, Central Asian partners, particularly Kazakhstan, can supplement efforts through grain transit and, eventually, nuclear technology cooperation. These measures would not eliminate dependence overnight but can begin a meaningful diversification process that supports Armenia’s sovereignty and regional stability. For Azerbaijan, the agreement also consolidates the territorial outcome of the 2020 and 2023 conflicts while enabling Baku to convert military success into long-term economic advantage through transit revenues and energy exports.
Reducing Russian Dependence
These diplomatic breakthroughs are meaningful largely because they enable Armenia’s economic diversification away from Russia. Since the 2020 War and the 2023 reintegration of Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia has accelerated its disengagement from Russia-led security structures. Freezing CSTO membership, closing the Minsk Process, and removing Russian border guards from Armenian airports represent deliberate efforts to restore sovereign control. Armenia’s reduced participation in the CIS and EAEU signals further political distance.27 The Russian military base in Gyumri remains the principal obstacle to full security autonomy. Public opinion trends reinforce this shift. Surveys indicate that positive perceptions of Russia among Armenians fell dramatically – from approximately 93 percent in 2019 to just 31 percent by 2024 – illustrating the depth of public disillusionment following widespread perceptions that Moscow failed to uphold Armenia’s security expectations during the 2020 war, subsequent border crises, and the 2023 collapse of Karabakh Armenian self-governance.28
Yet, Armenia’s most acute vulnerabilities remain economic, particularly in the energy and food sectors. Nearly 90 percent of Armenia’s natural gas is supplied through Gazprom Armenia, while Russia maintains ownership across its electricity grid, hydropower systems, and nuclear fuel supply.29 Furthermore, with more than 94 percent of wheat imports sourced from Russia, grain and essential goods are equally reliant.30 These dependencies constitute Russia’s most potent leverage. Reducing this exposure requires diversification through new transit integration routes, alternative energy sources, expanded European integration, and Armenian participation in regional economic frameworks. Without progress on economic deconfliction, Armenia’s geopolitical reorientation remains incomplete, thus limiting its sovereignty and constraining the South Caucasus architecture envisioned through TRIPP.
Political Continuity in Armenia
Sustained political leadership in Armenia is essential for TRIPP’s realization and the broader regional system of cross-regional transport networks. The Pashinyan government enables policy continuity, supports European integration, and sustains Armenia’s shift away from Russia. Recent public opinion surveys in Armenia indicate that economic stability, employment, and national security remain the dominant concerns among voters, suggesting that policies capable of delivering economic integration and regional stability may carry significant domestic political appeal.31 Consequently, a victory in 2026 aligns with both Azerbaijani and Turkish interests. TRIPP offers Türkiye a consolidated role as Europe’s principal transit bridge and positions Azerbaijan at the center of intersecting North-South and Middle Corridor networks.32
Though not solely reliant on these factors, achieving this outcome requires progress on normalization with Türkiye and a peace agreement with Azerbaijan. In this sense, diplomatic progress and electoral outcomes are mutually reinforcing. These steps strengthen Armenia’s economy, create political stability, reduce Russian leverage, and improve electoral conditions for the current government, which has pragmatically aligned itself with these outcomes. Political continuity in Armenia is therefore not simply a domestic political preference, but the linchpin of the region’s emerging architecture. A political reversal in Yerevan would likely stall normalization and corridor development, demonstrating the central role of domestic politics in the region’s geopolitical transformation.
It is also worth emphasizing the measurable support that Armenia is receiving from Washington to advance this process. The January 2026 publication of the U.S.-Armenia TRIPP Implementation Framework has operationalized the agenda,33 while the subsequent U.S.-Armenia nuclear agreement further demonstrates that regional realignment is already producing concrete diversification outcomes.34
Shared Compromises and Strategic Maturity
For this regional framework to emerge, all parties will need to accept difficult compromises grounded in self-interest. As several recent analyses note, peace agreements in the South Caucasus are unlikely to produce perfectly symmetrical outcomes. Still, uneven gains can create mutually beneficial incentives for cooperation when violence is renounced and trade expands.35 Türkiye must navigate politically sensitive historical issues and prioritize economic progress. Azerbaijan must commit to respecting Armenian territorial integrity, exercise restraint in demands, and support Armenia’s economic autonomy. Armenia must sequence sensitive historical and territorial issues alongside urgent needs, including economic diversification, sovereignty consolidation, and Russian deconfliction. The necessary compromises are modest relative to the transformative gains – diversified energy and trade, stable borders, reduced economic dependence, and a regional environment conducive to long-term growth. Rarely does diplomacy offer each side the opportunity to emerge more secure, prosperous, and politically empowered in exchange for limited concessions. This moment represents such an opportunity. Yet even successful diplomacy does not eliminate the historical grievances underlying regional conflicts.
Transitional Justice and Long-Term Reconciliation
Any assessment of the South Caucasus’s emerging regional order would be incomplete without acknowledging an issue that often receives less attention in discussions focused on geopolitical realism: the role of transitional justice and long-term reconciliation. While the immediate priority for Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Türkiye is the establishment of diplomatic normalization, peace agreements, and economic connectivity, the sustainability of these arrangements will ultimately depend on how underlying historical grievances are managed over time. Lasting peace requires mechanisms capable of addressing historical memory, competing narratives, and unresolved trauma.
The current diplomatic momentum reflects a pragmatic willingness by all three governments to prioritize
regional stability, economic integration, and policy autonomy. Achieving a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, alongside normalization between Armenia and Türkiye would represent an historic achievement in its own right. Lasting peace, however, requires more than political agreements or infrastructure development. For cooperation to withstand future shocks – whether regional crises, domestic political change, or external security pressures – there must eventually be a framework for acknowledging and addressing competing historical narratives. 36
Azerbaijan’s grievances are deeply rooted in the First Karabakh War and the nearly three decades during which large portions of its internationally recognized territory remained under Armenian control. These experiences include the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis, the 1992 Khojaly massacre, and the widespread destruction of cultural, religious, and environmental sites in territories recovered after the 2020 war. These issues remain central to Azerbaijani historical memory and national identity. 37
Armenian society also carries profound grievances. The displacement and near-total flight of the Armenian population from Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh for Armenians) following the 2023 military operation remains a deeply traumatic experience. Allegations of violence and human rights violations during this period continue to impact Armenian public discourse. At the same time, Armenia’s rapprochement with Türkiye occurs against the enduring backdrop of the Armenian Genocide and the collective memory of displacement that remains central to Armenian national identity and diaspora politics. 38
Türkiye’s position must also be considered within this landscape of competing historical narratives. Turkish state identity and political discourse have long rejected the genocide label, while Ankara has maintained strong political alignment with Azerbaijan since the closure of the Armenia–Türkiye border in 1993. As a result, the normalization process unfolds amidst a complex environment of historical sensitivities on all sides.
Transitional justice frameworks traditionally rest on four pillars: accountability, truth-seeking, reparations, and institutional reform.39 In the context of the South Caucasus, however, not all of these elements are equally feasible. Criminal accountability for historical crimes would be politically destabilizing and impractical given the passage of time and the potential implications for military and political leaders. Similarly, large-scale reparations programs would be extraordinarily difficult to implement given the scale of displacement, the involvement of diaspora communities, and the complexity of determining legitimate claims.40
More realistic approaches lie in the areas of truth-seeking and institutional reform. Over time, these could allow the parties to acknowledge historical suffering while avoiding measures that risk reopening old wounds. One possible mechanism would be the establishment of a trilateral historical or justice commission involving Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Türkiye. Such a body could provide a structured platform for examining archival materials, documenting historical violence, and facilitating dialogue between historians, policymakers, and civil society actors. Comparable mechanisms have been used in other post-conflict settings – including Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Peru – to help societies acknowledge competing narratives while building foundations for reconciliation.41
Symbolic measures could further complement these efforts. Joint recognition of civilian suffering, memorial initiatives for displaced communities, and collaborative cultural heritage preservation programs could provide avenues for acknowledging past trauma without destabilizing fragile political agreements. International support would also be important. The United States, the European Union, and international organizations such as the OSCE or UNESCO could play constructive roles in facilitating dialogue, supporting educational initiatives, and promoting cultural heritage cooperation. These efforts would not be short-term projects, but rather, long-term investments in regional reconciliation. Civil society exchanges between Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Turkish institutions could further reinforce this process. Track-two dialogue, academic cooperation, and policy exchanges can gradually break down entrenched stereotypes and foster a more cooperative political culture across the region.42
These initiatives cannot be implemented quickly, nor should they be introduced prematurely while diplomatic agreements remain fragile. Public debate over historical grievances could easily disrupt political momentum toward peace. However, acknowledging that these issues will eventually require careful and patient engagement is essential for ensuring that economic cooperation and political agreements rest on a stable social foundation. Ultimately, regional transit and economic integration are powerful incentives for cooperation. Yet, peace requires more than shared infrastructure or trade flows. By gradually incorporating elements of transitional justice into their long-term diplomatic engagement, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Türkiye can strengthen the durability of the emerging regional architecture and ensure that reconciliation evolves alongside economic and geopolitical cooperation.43
Impact on Other Regional Players
The United States
The United States is the primary external actor shaping this emerging system. For Washington, a stable and connected South Caucasus strengthens broader Eurasian objectives, particularly as engagement with Central Asia expands. By hosting the August 8 agreements at the White House44 and embedding dedicated diplomatic teams in Yerevan and Baku, Washington has tied its credibility to the success of peace and cross-regional transit efforts. The initial $145 million commitment to TRIPP demonstrates tangible investment, rather than symbolic diplomacy.45
Furthermore, Vice President Vance’s February 2026 visit to the region resulted not only in a nuclear cooperation agreement with Armenia, but also a strategic partnership charter with Azerbaijan, linking TRIPP to energy, nuclear, and multilateral partnership initiatives in both Armenia and Azerbaijan.46 Clearly, Washington is not treating TRIPP as a standalone transport project but as part of a broader economic-security infrastructure – a regional stabilization mechanism and a strategic asset for U.S. geoeconomic competition with Russia and China. Increasingly, U.S. policy treats regional transit infrastructure as a strategic security asset rather than a purely economic initiative. Ensuring the stability of the Caspian basin and the transport corridors linking Central Asia to Europe has therefore become a quiet but central element of Washington’s evolving South Caucasus diplomacy.
Central Asia
Central Asian states view TRIPP and the Middle Corridor as essential to their long-term economic diversification and geopolitical autonomy. The South Caucasus functions as a critical link connecting Central Asia to the Black Sea and European markets. Without Armenia-Azerbaijan stability and Armenia–Türkiye normalization, corridor development remains fragmented. A functional Middle Corridor enhances regional bargaining power, supports emerging C6 cooperation frameworks, and aligns with increasing U.S. and EU interest after the C6 Presidential Summit. It also increases the likelihood of a coherent Greater Central Asia Strategy emerging. As such, stability among Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Türkiye is a prerequisite for the Corridor’s functionality and for Central Asia’s emergence as a coherent bloc.
The European Union
The EU’s 2025 Black Sea Strategy highlights the region’s significance for energy security, critical raw materials, and trade. Its priorities, including resilience, sustainable growth, and connectivity, closely align with South Caucasus stabilization.47 Armenia’s expanding Partnership Agenda, visa mobility discussions, and the €270 million Resilience and Growth Plan reflect deepening ties.48 Azerbaijan and Türkiye benefit from Global Gateway investments exceeding €10 billion earmarked for Middle Corridor modernization.49 The EU’s plan to double the Southern Gas Corridor’s capacity by 2027 directly complements Azerbaijani and Turkish strategic interests.50 While TRIPP lies outside formal EU programming, it reinforces the Middle Corridor, enhances EU linkages across the South Caucasus, and fits neatly into broader European geoeconomic strategy.
European transit integration initiatives have also continued to evolve. In February 2026, the European Commission released a study mapping investment requirements for restoring and expanding trade routes linking Europe to Central Asia through the South Caucasus and Türkiye. The report formed part of a broader EU effort to operationalize cross-regional corridors under the Global Gateway initiative, emphasizing transport infrastructure, digital integration, and energy corridors spanning the Black Sea and the Trans-Caspian route. This was further strengthened under the Commission’s connectivity agenda linking the EU with Central Asia through Türkiye and the South Caucasus. These efforts reinforce the strategic logic underlying TRIPP by demonstrating that European policymakers increasingly view the South Caucasus as a central component of a larger Eurasian transit integration framework.51
At the same time, Azerbaijan’s suspension of ties with the European Parliament following its Nagorno-Karabakh resolution highlights the political sensitivities surrounding external engagement in the peace process. While Baku framed the move as a response to perceived interference, it reflects a broader tension between European political institutions and Azerbaijan’s post-conflict positioning.52 This dynamic does not undermine the EU’s strategic role in connectivity and energy cooperation, but it introduces an additional layer of political friction into the evolving regional landscape.
Georgia
Georgia is the primary outlier within South Caucasus cooperation. Extreme democratic backsliding under the Georgian Dream government and stalled progress on the Anaklia deep-sea port have eroded Western trust and undermined Georgia’s traditional role as the region’s primary transit gateway.53 Tbilisi’s ongoing and increasingly confrontational rhetoric toward the EU – including accusations that Brussels has politicized the enlargement process – have marginalized the country within evolving regional frameworks. Furthermore, increased alignment with Russia through sanctions evasion, illicit financial flows, and anti-democratic governance reforms has marginalized Georgia,54 while Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Türkiye move toward a cooperative infrastructure. Completion of TRIPP could bypass Georgia entirely, forcing Tbilisi to choose between continued dependence on Russia or reintegration with international connectivity systems. Ironically, regional progress enhances U.S. leverage, positioning Washington to offer Georgia a renewed role within a modernized transit system if it recommits to democratic norms and regional cooperation.
Iran
Although not directly involved in TRIPP, Iran remains an unavoidable regional actor whose policies influence the broader environment in which South Caucasus collaboration is unfolding. Tehran’s support for the competing International North-South Transport Corridor, its economic ties with Armenia, and past periodic tensions with Azerbaijan position it simultaneously as both a potential spoiler and a variable that must be accounted for in regional planning. These dynamics were acutely highlighted in March 2026, when drone strikes attributed to Iran targeted Azerbaijan’s Nakhichevan exclave, while Azerbaijani authorities reported foiling an alleged plot against a major regional pipeline.55 Regardless of the precise attribution of these incidents, they illustrate how quickly escalation in the Middle East can expose South Caucasus infrastructure to external shocks, underscoring the importance of resilient transit systems and cooperative regional security mechanisms.
At the same time, disruptions affecting the North-South Corridor have increased the strategic relevance of east-west corridor development. The Caspian basin increasingly functions as the hinge between two competing connectivity systems: the east–west Middle Corridor and the north–south transport network linking Russia, Iran, and India. Competition between these routes adds an additional geopolitical dimension to infrastructure development across the South Caucasus.56 While Iran cannot prevent the development of TRIPP or the broader Middle Corridor, it retains the capacity to complicate sequencing or exploit periods of political uncertainty. This has become evident from the recent closure of the Strait of Hormuz, following joint U.S.-Israeli attacks on Iran. Moreover, recent regional instability has demonstrated how quickly transportation and logistics networks can be affected by geopolitical crises. In the wake of Iranian retaliatory measures in 2026, commercial flights linking Europe and Asia were temporarily rerouted through a narrow aerial corridor over Armenia and Azerbaijan, vividly illustrating the close relationship between geopolitical stability and infrastructure resilience. Regardless of how the present conflict evolves or ends, these developments reinforce the importance of managing Iranian sensitivities, while maintaining the resilience of emerging transit networks.
Russia
Russia’s posture, meanwhile, has become more reactive and defensive. The gradual expansion of economic, diplomatic, and security cooperation among Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Türkiye – relationships historically shaped and often exploited by Moscow – has reduced Russia’s relative influence in a region it long regarded as part of its sphere of influence. At the same time, broader regional developments have produced mixed consequences for the Kremlin. Disruptions to the North-South Corridor through Iran have constrained one potential trade route, while volatility in global energy markets has, at times, benefited Russian oil and gas exports. Moscow, therefore, remains an important actor, though no longer the dominant arbiter of regional dynamics. Following what has become an expanded U.S. engagement with Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Kremlin has publicly emphasized that both states remain sovereign partners while reiterating its intention to maintain bilateral ties with each.57 Friction between Russia and Azerbaijan over criticism of the Karabakh trials further illustrates the evolving nature of Moscow’s regional engagement. Russia’s influence may have diminished significantly, but its presence continues to shape the geopolitical calculations of South Caucasus states as they pursue greater autonomy and regional cooperation.
Conclusion
The viability of a new South Caucasus architecture depends foremost on the completion of the TRIPP corridor, the connective backbone linking the region to Central Asia and Europe. TRIPP’s realization requires political continuity in Armenia, which depends on two upstream conditions: Armenia-Türkiye normalization and a finalized Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement. Both steps deliver substantial economic and geopolitical benefits, as well as regional stability prospects to Türkiye and Azerbaijan that significantly outweigh their respective compromises. Their advancement strengthens Armenia’s economy, deepens its integration with Europe, and reduces Russian leverage, creating the electoral environment necessary for democratic forces to prevail in 2026.
A 2026 electoral victory for Pashinyan is therefore a strategic necessity aligned with the interests of both Azerbaijan and Türkiye. If these processes align, TRIPP can be completed, establishing a cooperative framework across the South Caucasus and bringing the Middle Corridor significantly closer to full realization. Over the longer term, however, durable stability will also depend on whether economic integration is gradually matched by reconciliation efforts capable of addressing historical grievances and competing national narratives. The result would be a more stable, interconnected, and strategically autonomous region, better positioned to contribute to broader Eurasian connectivity and long-term prosperity. In this sense, the future of the South Caucasus may be determined less by historical grievances alone than by which states most effectively convert geography into durable political order.
1 U.S. Department of State, “Joint Statement on the Publication of the U.S.–Armenia Implementation Framework for the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP),” January 13, 2026. https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/01/joint-statement-on-the-publication-of-the-u-s-armenia-implementation-framework-for-the-trump-route-for-international-peace-and-prosperity-tripp; Reuters, “U.S. Vice President Vance Heads to Armenia and Azerbaijan to Push Peace and Trade Corridor,” February 9, 2026; Reuters, “U.S. and Azerbaijan Sign Strategic Partnership Charter During Vance Visit,” February 10, 2026.
2 Stretch, Aidan. “Moldova Accuses Russia of Election Interference Ahead of Key Vote.” Atlantic Council – UkraineAlert, September 22, 2025. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/moldova-accuses-russia-of-election-interference-ahead-of-key-vote/; Marocico, Olga; Mirodan, Sergiu; and Ings, Rosie. “How a Russian-Funded Fake-News Network Aims to Disrupt Elections in Europe.” BBC News, September 21, 2025. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4g5kl0n5d2o.
3 Cornell, Svante E. Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the Caucasus. Routledge, 2001.
4 Thomas de Waal. The Caucasus: An Introduction. Oxford University Press, 2010; Sergey Markedonov. “Russia’s Policy in the South Caucasus: Between Integration and Hegemony.” CSIS, 2020.
5 Laurence Broers. Armenia and Azerbaijan: Anatomy of a Rivalry. Edinburgh University Press, 2019.
6 International Crisis Group (ICG). “Improving Prospects for Peace After the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War.” ICG Report No. 259, 2021.
7 Thomas de Waal. Great Catastrophe: Armenians and Turks in the Shadow of Genocide. Oxford University Press, 2015; International Crisis Group. “Turkey and Armenia: Opening Minds, Opening Borders.” ICG Europe Report No. 199, 2009.
8 Laurence Broers. Armenia and Azerbaijan: Anatomy of a Rivalry. Edinburgh University Press, 2019.
9 Thomas de Waal. “The Caucasus in Flames Again.” Carnegie Europe, 2020.
10https://en.apa.az/foreign-policy/turkiye-hopes-full-azerbaijan-armenia-peace-agreement-will-be-signed-soon-guler-says-484737
11 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). “Armenia Country Strategy,” 2020–2025; World Bank. “Armenia Trade Snapshot,” 2021–2023; International Energy Agency (IEA). “Armenia 2022 Energy Profile.”
12 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). “OSCE Ministerial Council Decision Marks New Step Towards Sustainable Peace in the South Caucasus.” OSCE Newsroom, 1 September 2025. https://www.osce.org/chairpersonship/596899.
13 Associated Press, December 29. “Turkey and Armenia agree to simplify visa procedures to normalize ties.” https://apnews.com/article/turkey-armenia-ease-visa-requirement-reconciliation-03bb189108950e9da5bd9cd7296a27aa.
14 Hurriyet Daily News. “Turkish Vice President in Yerevan as European Leaders Convene Summit.” Hurriyet Daily News, May 4, 2026.
15 Commonspace.eu. “President Ilham Aliyev Addressed European Political Community Summit.” Commonspace.eu, May 4, 2026.
16 Associated Press, “Turkey and Armenia Simplify Visa Procedures in New Step Toward Normalization,” December 29, 2025. https://apnews.com/article/turkey-armenia-ease-visa-requirement-reconciliation-03bb189108950e9da5bd9cd7296a27aa; The Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, February 9, 2026. “Nikol Pashinyan and JD Vance make statements for media representatives.” https://www.primeminister.am/en/press-release/item/2026/02/09/Nikol-Pashinyan-J-D-Vance-Announcement; CivilNet, “Erdoğan Signals Symbolic Steps with Armenia in the New Year,” December 16, 2025. https://www.civilnet.am/en/news/992283/erdogan-signals-symbolic-steps-with-armenia-in-the-new-year/.
17 Özerdem, Alpaslan, and Olesya Vartanyan. “Türkiye-Armenia Border Reopening: A Turning Point for the South Caucasus.” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, March 2026. https://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13947-t%C3%BCrkiye-armenia-border-reopening-a-turning-point-for-the-south-caucasus.html.
18 International Republican Institute. Public Opinion Survey: Residents of Armenia, June 2025. Washington, DC: IRI Center for Insights in Survey Research, 2025. https://www.iri.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/ARM-NS-25-PT-01-FINAL-for-Publication.pdf; De Waal, Thomas. “Armenia–Türkiye Rapprochement: What It Means for the South Caucasus.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2025. https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2025/06/armenia-turkiye-rapprochement?lang=en.
19 Tridge. “Turkey’s Grain Production Expected to Drop 12% in 2025.” Tridge Newsroom, October 24, 2025. https://www.tridge.com/news/turkeys-grain-production-expected-to-drop-12-kvrepo.
20 Framed by the US Administration as the Trump Declaration for Enduring Peace and Prosperity. The White House. “The Trump Declaration for Enduring Peace and Prosperity.” Presidential Action, October 2025. https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/10/the-trump-declaration-for-enduring-peace-and-prosperity/.
21 International Crisis Group. Armenia and Azerbaijan: The Hard Road to a Lasting Peace. Europe Report No. 98, 5 September 2025. https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/caucasus/armenian-azerbaijani-conflict/98-armenia-and-azerbaijan-hard-road-lasting-peace.
22 Research Center on Security Policy (RCSP). “Trends in Armenian–Azerbaijani Relations Normalization and the Probability of Signing a Peace Treaty.” RCSP, January 14, 2025. https://rcsp.am/en/entry/5936/trends-in-armenian-azerbaijani-relations-normalization-and-the-probability-of-signing-a-peace-treaty/.
23 International Committee of the Red Cross. “Armenia: Operational Highlights for the First Half of 2025.” ICRC, October 20, 2025. https://www.icrc.org/en/article/armenia-operational-highlights-first-half-2025; Canbäck, Rasmus. “Exclusive: Azerbaijan’s ‘Western Azerbaijan’ Campaign Exposed in Leaked Documents.” OC Media, November 3, 2025. https://oc-media.org/exclusive-azerbaijans-western-azerbaijan-campaign-exposed-in-leaked-documents/.
24De Waal, Thomas, Zaur Shiriyev and Areg Kochinyan. “Is 2026 a Turning Point for Armenia and Azerbaijan?” Europe Inside Out, podcast audio, February 11, 2026, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/podcasts/europe-inside-out/is-2026-a-turning-point-for-armenia-and-azerbaijan.
25 Ryzhko, Kristina and Zhanel Sabirova. “Stability Brings Profits: How the Armenian-Azerbaijan Peace Deal Could Transform the Region’s Economy.” Caspian Policy Center, August 20, 2025. https://www.caspianpolicy.org/research/category/stability-brings-profits-how-the-armenian-azerbaijan-peace-deal-could-transform-the-regions-economy.
26 Zolyan, Mikayel. “Have a Good TRIPP: Can Economic Cooperation Pave the Way for Lasting Peace for Armenia and Azerbaijan.” Caucasus Edition, October 14, 2025. https://caucasusedition.net/have-a-good-tripp-can-economic-cooperation-pave-the-way-for-lasting-peace-for-armenia-and-azerbaijan/; Caucasus Watch. “Building Armenia’s Future: The Resilience and Growth Plan Driving Key Infrastructure Projects.” Caucasus Watch, November 17, 2024. https://caucasuswatch.de/en/news/building-armenias-future-the-resilience-and-growth-plan-driving-key-infrastructure-projects.html.
27 MacFarquhar, Neil. “Armenia to Withdraw from Russia-Led Military Alliance as Ties with Moscow Sour.” CNN, June 13, 2024. https://edition.cnn.com/2024/06/13/europe/armenia-withdraw-russia-alliance-azerbaijan-intl; Barseghyan, Arshaluys. “Pashinyan: ‘We Will Leave’ Russia-Led Security Pact.” OC-Media, June 12, 2024. https://oc-media.org/armenia-to-leave-russia-led-security-pact/.
28 Linderman, Laura. “Divergent Paths in the South Caucasus: Strategy, Survival, Retreat.” American Foreign Policy Council, March 6, 2026. https://www.afpc.org/publications/articles/divergent-paths-in-the-south-caucasus-strategy-survival-retreat.
29 De Waal, Thomas. “Armenia Leaves the Russian Orbit.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2024. https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2024/06/armenia-leaves-russian-orbit?lang=en; Pastucha, Tymon and Wojciech Wojtasiewicz. “Armenia Faces Strategic and Financial Challenges in Nuclear Energy Development.” Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), July 22, 2025 https://www.pism.pl/publications/armenia-faces-strategic-and-financial-challenges-in-nuclear-energy-development.
30 Nazaretyan, Hovhannes. “Armenia’s Economic Dependence on Russia: How Deep Does It Go?” EVN Report, July 7, 2023. https://evnreport.com/economy/armenias-economic-dependence-on-russia-how-deep-does-it-go/.
31 International Republican Institute. Public Opinion Survey: Residents of Armenia, February–March 2026. Washington, DC: Center for Insights in Survey Research, International Republican Institute, 2026. https://www.iri.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/ARM-26-NS-01-PT-FINAL_Public.pdf.
32 Also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR). Ministry of Digital Development and Transport of the Republic of Azerbaijan. “East–West Corridor.” Transit.gov.az. Accessed November 25, 2025. https://transit.gov.az/en/corridors/east-west-corridor.
33 U.S. State Department, Jan. 13, 2026, on the U.S.–Armenia TRIPP Implementation Framework. https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2026/01/joint-statement-on-the-publication-of-the-u-s-armenia-implementation-framework-for-the-trump-route-for-international-peace-and-prosperity-tripp.
34 Reuters, Feb. 9–10, 2026. “U.S.–Armenia civil nuclear cooperation and Vance’s push for TRIPP.” https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-vice-president-vance-heads-armenia-azerbaijan-push-peace-trade-2026-02-09/.
35 Outzen, Richard. “Win/Win/Lose in the South Caucasus.” The Caravan Notebook, December 16, 2025. https://www.hoover.org/research/winwinlose-south-caucasus.
36 United Nations. Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice. New York: United Nations, 2010.
37 Broers, Laurence. Armenia and Azerbaijan: Anatomy of a Rivalry. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2019.
38 Suny, Ronald Grigor. “They Can Live in the Desert but Nowhere Else”: A History of the Armenian Genocide. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015.
39 Teitel, Ruti G. Transitional Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
40 De Greiff, Pablo, ed. The Handbook of Reparations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006; Arthur, Paige. “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice.” Human Rights Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2009): 321–367.
41 Hayner, Priscilla B. Unspeakable Truths: Transitional Justice and the Challenge of Truth Commissions. 2nd ed. New York: Routledge, 2011.
42 International Crisis Group. Reconciliation in the South Caucasus: Lessons from Civil Society Dialogue. Europe Report. Brussels: International Crisis Group.
43 Lederach, John Paul. Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997.
44 Ostiller, Nate. “Explainer | What You Need to Know About the Historic Aliyev–Trump–Pashinyan Meeting.” OC Media, August 11, 2025. https://oc-media.org/explainer-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-historic-aliyev-trump-pashinyan-meeting/.
45 Barseghyan, Arshaluys. OC Media. “US to Provide $145 Million to Armenia for Trump Route.” OC Media, February 10, 2026. https://oc-media.org/us-to-provide-145-million-to-armenia-for-trump-route/.
46 Reuters, Feb. 10, 2026, on the U.S.–Azerbaijan strategic partnership charter. https://www.reuters.com/world/us-azerbaijan-sign-strategic-partnership-charter-during-vance-visit-2026-02-10/.
47 European Commission. EU Strategic Approach: Black Sea Strategy. Brussels: European Commission, 2025. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/170d9b3a-d45f-4169-80fa-9adb753c0921_en?filename=EU+Strategic+Approach+Black+Sea+Strategy.pdf.
48 Von Essen, Hugo, and Jakob Hedenskog. Threading the Needle: Boosting Armenia’s Resilience and Deepening EU Cooperation. SCEEUS Report No. 17, 4 December 2024. https://sceeus.se/en/publications/threading-the-needle-boosting-armenias-resilience-and-deepening-eu-cooperation/.
49 During the April, 2025 EU-Central Asia Summit, the EU unveiled an additional €12 billion Global Gateway investment package for Central Asia, allocating €3 billion for transport; €2.5 billion for CRMs; and €6.4 billion for water, energy, and climate. This was reaffirmed at the Trans-Caspian Transit Corridor (TCTC) Investors and Connectivity Forum in late-November, 2025. Muradzada, Ilham. “Azerbaijan: Gateway and Driver of the Middle Corridor.” Eureporter, August 7, 2025. https://www.eureporter.co/world/azerbaijan-world/2025/08/07/azerbaijan-gateway-and-driver-of-the-middle-corridor/; Zipatolla, Shyngyz. “Rethinking EU Strategy in Central Asia.” DGAP: German Council on Foreign Relations, May 14, 2025. https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/rethinking-eu-strategy-central-asia.
50 Yusifli, Kanan. “No Membership, Yet Essential: Azerbaijan in the EU’s Strategic Calculus.” Caucasus Edition, July 25, 2025. https://caucasusedition.net/no-membership-yet-essential-azerbaijan-in-the-eus-strategic-calculus/; European Commission. “EU Strengthens Cross-Regional Cooperation with Black Sea Countries, the South Caucasus and Central Asia.” Press Release, October 20, 2025. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/de/ip_25_2452.
51 European Commission / DG ENEST, Feb. 6, 2026, “EU study maps investment needs to rebuild trade routes between Europe and Central Asia via the Caucasus.” https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-study-maps-investment-needs-rebuild-trade-routes-between-europe-and-central-asia-caucasus-2026-02-06_en; European Commission / DG ENEST, Feb. 6, 2026, “Advancing a Cross-Regional Connectivity Agenda, linking the EU with Central Asia, via Türkiye and the South Caucasus.” https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/advancing-cross-regional-connectivity-agenda-linking-eu-central-asia-turkiye-and-south-caucasus_en.
52 Bagirova, Nailia. “Azerbaijan Summons EU Envoy in Row over Treatment of Karabakh Armenians.” Reuters, May 1, 2026.
53 Transparency International Georgia. “Anaklia Port to Be Built — Chinese Company Has Suspicious Reputation.” Transparency.ge, August 15, 2025. https://transparency.ge/en/post/anaklia-port-be-built-chinese-company-suspicious-reputation.
54 Roubanis, Ilya, and Anonymous Co-author. “Long Read | Dealing with the Sanctions Bubble in Georgia.” Foreign Policy Centre, October 29, 2025. https://fpc.org.uk/dealing-with-the-sanctions-bubble-in-georgia/.
55 Bagirova, Nailia and Lucy Papachristou. “Azerbaijan says four injured by Iranian drones, vows to retaliate. Reuters, March 5, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/missiles-drones-coming-iran-fell-airport-azerbaijan-source-says-2026-03-05/; Reuters. “Azerbaijan says it foils Iranian plots, including plan to attack major pipeline,” March 7, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/azerbaijan-says-it-foils-iranian-plots-including-plan-attack-major-pipeline-2026-03-07/.
56 Coffey, Luke. “Securing the Caspian: The Quiet Strategic Shift Behind America’s Caucasus Diplomacy.” Caspian Policy Center, March 6, 2026. https://www.caspianpolicy.org/research/security/securing-the-caspian-the-quiet-strategic-shift-behind-americas-caucasus-diplomacy.
57 Reuters. “After Vance visit, the Kremlin says Russia will develop ties with Armenia and Azerbaijan,” February 11, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/after-vance-visit-kremlin-says-russia-will-develop-ties-with-armenia-azerbaijan-2026-02-11/.