‘Ceasefire’ talks pose difficult questions for Ukrainian refugees

Russia’s full-scale war on Ukraine forced millions of people to flee and become refugees. Ukraine’s economy and demographics were badly hit by this outflow. The government in Kyiv is desperate to bring its people back and has launched a new ministry to work with Ukrainians abroad. But refugees themselves are increasingly integrated in their host countries – despite unclear prospects of legal permanent settlement there. What would a potential ceasefire or a ‘peace deal’ with Russia mean for Ukrainian refugees?

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Seven million people, according to the UN, left Ukraine after Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022. More than 4.2 million were granted temporary protection in the EU. Around 1.1 million Ukrainian refugees now reside in Germany, 900,000 in Poland and 380,000 in the Czech Republic. More than 200,000 Ukrainian refugees are each hosted by the UK, US and Canada.

Initially keen to return to their home country and hopeful that the war would end soon, many Ukrainians now feel differently. Surveys by Kyiv-based Centre for Economic Strategy revealed that 74% said they wanted to return in November 2022, but that number had fallen to around 42% by December 2024. Most refugees say they are hesitant to return to Ukraine until a sustainable peace is secured.

While host countries encourage Ukrainians to integrate and join the labor market (more than two thirds of Ukrainian refugees in Poland, Czechia and the UK are employed or self-employed), few offer concrete and clear pathways towards permanent settlement.

In the UK, both Conservative and Labour governments refused to provide Ukrainians with a route towards permanent settlement, typically granted to other refugees – despite numerous petitions from Ukrainians living there. Current policy envisages that the UK will extend protection to Ukrainian refugees for a maximum period of 4.5 years. People who wish to remain in the UK after that will have to meet strict criteria to be able to switch to other types of visas. This will not be realistic for the vast majority of Ukrainian refugees.

The UK government says this approach was developed in consultation with the Ukrainian authorities who want to bring their people back. Indeed, the Ukrainian economy lost a third of its consumer base as a result of the outflow of refugees, and projected economic losses in case refugees do not return might amount to 7.7% of annual GDP. The population of Ukraine shrank from 42 to less than 35 million people after 2022, and Ukraine has the highest mortality and the lowest fertility rate in the world. It is understandable why the government is so concerned – it even launched a new Ministry of Unity to encourage refugees to return home.

Recent discussions about a possible ceasefire, or even a peace deal between Ukraine and Russia, might raise hopes for Ukrainian refugees’ return – but this might not be entirely voluntary. If a settlement with Russia, however temporary, is reached, it might prompt host country governments to withdraw protection to Ukrainian refugees. The US administration has already stopped accepting new applications from Ukrainians and is considering a withdrawal of protection or even the deportation of 240,000 Ukrainian refugees there.

Public opinion in some countries is increasingly unfavorable to continuing support for Ukrainian refugees – and this discontent is regularly fueled by domestic political actors and Russian disinformation campaigns. In Poland, polls suggest that 30% of the population held a negative attitude to Ukrainian refugees, while 25% had a positive one, as of late 2024. More than half of Poles believed their government’s support for Ukrainian refugees was excessive – despite the lack of almost any benefit payments for Ukrainians there. The issue of Ukrainian refugees has become an important topic in Poland’s presidential campaign, with all major candidates in the wake of the May 2025 elections supporting the move to scrap child benefits for Ukrainian refugees who do not work (mostly for health-related reasons).

Poland, as well as Czechia, benefits economically from the presence of a large number of Ukrainians: they contribute more to the state budget than these countries spend on supporting Ukrainian refugees. However, in Czechia, the majority of the population (64%) wants the government to prevent further arrivals of refugees and believes Ukrainians should return to their country as soon as the war ends. The tendency towards reducing social support for Ukrainians is evident in other countries, such as Ireland, while some, like Norway, adopt stricter rules to limit new arrivals of refugees from Ukraine.

The EU’s temporary protection directive for Ukrainians, which has been extended yearly since 2022, will remain in place until March 2026. After that point, however, many Ukrainian refugees might be expected to return – especially if a ceasefire or a peace deal with Russia is signed.

A potential decision to stop offering protection to Ukrainian refugees would, however, be premature and might expose more Ukrainians to risk. There is little trust in Ukraine that Russia would stick to any agreement that would put an end to the war. If such an agreement is made by forcing Ukraine into concessions – or if Ukraine is denied military support by the US for its refusal to make them – that would reward Russia for its aggression. Ukrainians who stayed in Ukraine – and those who return either by their own free will or because their protection status is withdrawn by host countries – might face a renewed Russian attack very soon if there is no accountability for Russia. Putin does not hide his intention to continue the war and subjugate all of Ukraine.

Ukrainian refugees I have talked to as part of my research for Chatham House said that long-term, sustainable peace, not a temporary ceasefire, is a main pre-condition for their return. Many of them have been displaced twice, in 2014 from the Russian-occupied Donbas region and Crimea, and in 2022, as a result of the full-scale invasion. They can’t bear the thought of having to flee from yet another Russian attack on Ukraine. Living under Russian occupation is also not an option for Ukrainians, as they are aware of the systemic torture, abuse and persecution of Ukrainians in territories currently held by Russia.

Countries that offered temporary protection to Ukrainian refugees, therefore, should not rush into pushing them to return once a ceasefire is agreed. They should make their decisions based on the situation on the ground, not on formal agreements with Russia.

The EU should also consider contingency planning for the scenario in which the US again stops supplying air defence to Ukraine. This would expose residents of big Ukrainian cities like Kyiv, Odesa or Lviv, which were relatively well protected by the American Patriot air defence systems, to Russian missile and drone attacks. Strikes on civilian objects with high number of casualties could trigger a new wave of refugees from Ukraine. European partners of Ukraine should urgently be discussing how to protect Ukraine’s skies.

Olga Tokariuk is a Senior Analyst at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, based in London. Her research is focused on state-sponsored information operations and disinformation, particularly in the context of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Olga is also an Academy Associate at Chatham House’s Ukraine Forum and an Associate at Imperial War Museums.

Posted In: Democratic Security Institute

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