{"id":673,"date":"2020-02-04T20:58:00","date_gmt":"2020-02-04T20:58:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/?p=673"},"modified":"2024-09-04T18:34:23","modified_gmt":"2024-09-04T18:34:23","slug":"state-capture-by-means-of-constitution-armenian-and-hungarian-cases","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/?p=673","title":{"rendered":"State Capture by Means of Constitution: Armenian and Hungarian Cases"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

By\u00a0Armen Grigoryan<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Introduction <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 2012, when President Serzh Sargsyan suspended diplomatic relations with Hungary after the extradition of Ramil Safarov to Azerbaijan, most Armenians\u2019 perception that Hungary\u2019s Prime Minister Viktor Orb\u00e1n himself played an important, if not decisive role in the unfortunate decision to extradite the notorious axe-murderer, was quite accurate. It is a bit ironic that Orb\u00e1n\u2019s certain actions have become a reference point for some Armenian political actors connected to the former ruling Republican Party of Armenia (RPA). <\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n

Back in 2012, RPA-linked nationalist activists threw eggs and\ntomatoes at the Honorary Consulate of Hungary in Yerevan and burned a Hungarian\nflag. Yet, RPA deputy chair Armen Ashotyan recently indicated that the party\nhas been maintaining ties with a Hungarian party[i] \u2013 presumably with Orb\u00e1n\u2019s\nFidesz, as both are members of the European People\u2019s Party. On the other side,\nthere is essentially no doubt that if Nikol Pashinyan\u2019s cabinet had restored\nfull-fledged relations with Hungary, its opponents, including the RPA, would\ncry betrayal of national interests. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the same time, as the RPA is in opposition, trying to\nstage a comeback, some groups close to it have been supplementing their\nnationalist-conservative agenda \u2013 loaded with conspiracy theories and other\nfeatures resembling \u201calt-right\u201d \u2013 with suggestions that Armenia should follow\nHungary\u2019s example in a certain aspect of policy, namely banishing the Open\nSociety Foundation.[ii] It is not yet fully clear whether the approval of\nOrb\u00e1n\u2019s policies follows suggestions of foreign consultants not concerned about\ncertain Armenian sensitivities, or rather indicates right-wing populists\u2019 wish\nto develop ties with like-minded foreign partners. Evidence of attempts to\nbuild such ties, particularly with the German AfD, has already appeared.[iii] <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The not-so-unintended outcome of the\nconstitutional amendments in Armenia <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Constitutional amendments adopted in Armenia in 2015 seemed\nthe safest way for then-president Serzh Sargsyan who had to solve the problem\nof retaining power after his second presidential term. Sargsyan and his\nentourage probably considered the transition to a parliamentary system the\nsafest option, preferable to either the Russian model, i.e. appointing a\n\u201cplaceholder\u201d and standing for election again in five years, or the Azerbaijani\nmodel, i.e. removing the constitutional ban on a third presidential term.\nEither of those models could be expected to make power succession problematic\nas presidential elections had traditionally been accompanied by opposition\nmobilization and mass protests threatening regime stability.[iv] The actual\noutcome of the transition, resulting in the Velvet Revolution, was unexpected. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, as the current political crisis involving the\nConstitutional Court shows, the constitutional amendments, in addition to the\nattempt to secure a de facto third term and a further hold on power for\nSargsyan, were arranged in a fashion allowing the RPA to retain control over\nthe judiciary and several other institutions. As a result, a number of RPA\nappointees and cronies cannot be removed from office unless they resign. The\nsituation essentially amounts to a state capture embedded in the constitution.\nThough enjoying a two-thirds parliamentary majority, Pashinyan\u2019s cabinet most\nlikely may not avoid a protracted political crisis without adopting a\ndeclaration condemning the state capture and initiating adoption of a new\nconstitution. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

From an Armenian perspective, it is worth having a closer\nlook at the processes that have taken place in Hungary during the last few\nyears. Furthermore, it is possible to draw a parallel between certain processes\nin the two countries. Such a comparison might help to understand some common\ntrends better. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Hungarian parallels <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

After winning a parliamentary supermajority in 2010, Prime\nMinister Orb\u00e1n used it for rewriting Hungary\u2019s constitution. As a result, the\nConstitutional Court, the judiciary, the Central Bank, the State Audit Office,\nthe National Fiscal Council, the State Prosecution Service, media regulators,\nand other state institutions could be controlled by Orb\u00e1n\u2019s appointees firmly,\nand, therefore, the system of checks and balances virtually disappeared.[v]\nVisiting lecturer at the Humboldt University Berlin D\u00e1niel Heged\u0171s called the\ncurrent state of affairs \u201cstate capture embedded in Hungary\u2019s current\nFundamental Law.\u201d[vi] <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The election system was restructured in Fidesz\u2019s favor,\nallowing it to win even if it gets fewer votes: In 2018, Fidesz won a\ntwo-thirds majority for the third consecutive time even though opposition\nparties combined received one hundred thousand more votes.[vii] In addition to\nredrawing the boundaries of electoral districts, Fidesz has greatly benefited\nfrom votes of ethnic Hungarians in neighboring Slovakia, Serbia, Romania and\nUkraine who had been granted citizenship and voting rights with a possibility\nto vote for national party lists by mail. In 2014 elections, over 95 percent of\nvotes cast by non-domestic citizens went to Fidesz.[viii] A similar voting\npattern could be observed in 2018 as well. Additionally, in 2018 a number of\nvoters from Ukraine\u2019s Transcarpathian region were registered in some villages\nin Eastern Hungary, thereby getting an opportunity to vote in individual\nconstituencies too, and were transported to their new constituencies \u2013 where\nsome single-story houses provided registered address for up to 200 people \u2013 on\nthe election day. Furthermore, fraud including vote buying, voter intimidation,\ntampering with votes sent by mail, missing ballots, and election software\nmalfunctions also seems to have contributed to Fidesz\u2019s supermajority.[ix] <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Orb\u00e1n\u2019s critics mostly considered his third consecutive\nvictory a sign of emerging autocracy. Before the 2018 elections, it was noted\nthat Orb\u00e1n managed \u201cto build a self-styled illiberal state, with few effective\nchecks on his power, a public media the government uses to propagate its views\nand attack its opponents, as well as a new class of politically-connected\noligarchs holding increasing sway over the economy.\u201d[x] There were also\nwarnings that the situation could even get worse: \u201cIn Hungary, it is not just\nthe rule of law that has been under threat. \u2026 Unless one wants to say that a democracy\nremains a democracy as long as the government does not stuff the ballot boxes\non Election Day, it is crucial to insist that democracy itself is being\ndamaged. \u2026 This election is probably the last before Hungary shifts from what\nis already a deeply damaged democracy to what political scientists would call a\nfull-blown electoral autocracy. Elections would still be held in the future,\nbut a real turnover of power would be impossible.\u201d[xi] Heged\u0171s also argued:\n\u201cGiven the uninterrupted authoritarianization process as well as Orb\u00e1n\u2019s\noutspoken threat toward his adversaries \u2026 elections will be the last somehow\nfree ones in Hungary if he can keep power in his grip. \u2026 If Orb\u00e1n wins again,\nthe illiberal state of Hungary will soon turn out to be authoritarian.\u201d[xii] <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The media, pundits, and policymakers in Europe and beyond\nhave also paid tremendous attention to methods used to make Orb\u00e1n\u2019s family and\nclose friends rich. Indeed, it took only nine years since Orb\u00e1n\u2019s becoming\nprime minister in 2010 for his childhood friend, former gas fitter L\u0151rinc\nM\u00e9sz\u00e1ros, who boasts he is \u201csmarter than Mark Zuckerberg\u201d and says he owes his\nfortune to \u201cGod, luck, and Viktor Orb\u00e1n,\u201d to become the richest Hungarian with\na handsome fortune of over a billion Euros.[xiii] A large part of that wealth\nhas been accumulated from state procurements for water supply systems, roads,\nand monopolized tobacco shop concessions.[xiv] Orb\u00e1n\u2019s father and two brothers\ngrew rich thanks to a dubious privatization deal and state construction\nprojects, and Orb\u00e1n\u2019s son-in-law Istv\u00e1n Tiborcz has also largely benefited from\ndubious procurement of state and EU-funded projects often distributed by\ntenders without competitors.[xv] The level of absurdity of Orb\u00e1n\u2019s cronyism may\nbe further underlined by the fate of the law on public procurement adopted in\n2015. It initially included a passage forbidding the highest state officials\nand their family members from making public procurements bids, and a month\nlater the parliament amended the law, making it possible for family members to\ntake part in bids unless they live in the same household.[xvi] <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Similarities and possible solutions <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Let us again summarize what has happened in Hungary since\n2010, causing the fears of autocracy. The constitution was amended to provide\nan advantage for the ruling party. Particularly, the system of checks and\nbalances was removed, so the executive may effectively control all state\ninstitutions and public media. The election system has been tampered with\ncontinuously so it would disproportionately favor the ruling party. Besides,\nethnic kin in neighboring states was granted citizenship and voting rights,\ngiving an additional advantage to Fidesz. Prime minister\u2019s relatives and\nfriends have become rich. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

There are, of course, some additional features of Orb\u00e1n\u2019s\nilliberal regime. B\u00e1lint Magyar notes that as all the political power has been\nmonopolized, large businesses not committing themselves to the ruling party are\neither forced to surrender, or become the targets of efforts at economic annihilation.\nRival oligarchs having their own political ambitions face direct state\ncoercion, but those who just try to avoid full loyalty to the \u201cpolitical mafia\nfamily\u201d get a similar treatment.[xvii] Concerning educational and cultural\npolicies, there are plans to expand a \u201cpatriotic education\u201d program including\ncompulsory military training for secondary schools, which may ultimately turn\nthe education system into a place for ideological indoctrination.[xviii] The\nlist of characteristic features of Orb\u00e1n\u2019s \u201cilliberal\u201d state may be continued. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

It is obvious that for about two decades before the Velvet\nRevolution Armenia shared a number of features with the current Hungarian\nsystem. The judiciary, the Central Bank, media regulator and other state\ninstitutions were subjugated to the executive branch. The electoral system was\nmanipulated continuously to give an advantage to the RPA and its allies.\nConstitutional amendments adopted in 2005 granted citizenship to ethnic kin\nabroad, so ethnic Armenians in Georgia\u2019s Javakheti region became voters\nregistered in large numbers at some addresses in Armenia and were transported\nto voting stations on election days (meanwhile, Armenians having no dual\ncitizenship and living abroad, many of whom were critical of the government, were\nnot allowed to vote). State officials, their relatives and friends became rich.\nThe police and tax authorities harassed oligarchs who dared to support the\nopposition or show political ambitions of their own; the best-known case was\nPresident Sargsyan\u2019s ad hominem attack on the Prosperous Armenia Party\u2019s leader\nGagik Tsarukyan, followed by coercive actions, in 2015. As regards \u201cpatriotic\neducation,\u201d Armenia effectively got it under the Kocharyan and Sargsyan\npresidencies, as ministers of education \u2013 Levon Mkrtchyan, who used to advance\nArmenian Revolutionary Federation Dashnaktsutyun\u2019s ideology, and then RPA\u2019s\nArmen Ashotyan \u2013 introduced military-patriotic propaganda and religious\nindoctrination disguised as history of the Armenian Church at high schools. Most\nimportantly, in addition to circumventing the ban on occupying the president\u2019s\noffice for more than two consecutive terms, constitutional amendments adopted\nin 2015 institutionalized RPA\u2019s privileged position: a mechanism securing\ncontrol over some institutions \u2013 most importantly the Constitutional Court and\nthe judiciary \u2013 was introduced, allowing the former regime to retain control\neven without parliamentary representation. Drawing further parallels is also\npossible. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Hungary has neither experienced the same level of voting\nfraud as Armenia, nor has seen massive violence against opposition candidates\nand activists, including beatings, kidnapping, or use of deadly force, like on\nMarch 1, 2008. Yet, as mentioned above, some analysts argue that it has reached\na situation when perhaps \u201celections would still be held in the future, but a\nreal turnover of power will be impossible.\u201d Similarly, under the previous\nArmenian regime a turnover of power by means of elections was essentially\nimpossible. As argued before, already after the March 1, 2008 events, a\nnegotiated transition requiring free elections organized by the incumbent\nauthorities had become an unrealistic scenario, so civil disobedience aiming at\nregime collapse remained the only possibility for a non-violent regime\nchange.[xix] The constitutional amendments adopted in 2015, aiming at regime\npreservation, reconfirmed the impossibility of regime change by means of\nelections, so the situation climaxed with the Velvet Revolution. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

As Heged\u0171s noted, even if in 2018 there was a little chance\nthat the Hungarian opposition could unite and jointly get a majority of votes,\nit certainly would not get a two-thirds majority required to amend the\nconstitution. Therefore, a new government would not be able to change the\ninstitutional setting created by Fidesz and dismantle the state capture\nembedded in the current Fundamental Law without violating the constitutional\norder and the rule of law. However, otherwise Fidesz would be able to return to\npower within a short time. Therefore, if the opposition had managed to win, it\nwould have needed exceptional measures, and the EU would also need to decide\nupon its position concerning a new government\u2019s possible attempt to dismantle\nOrb\u00e1n\u2019s illiberal state by circumventing the constitution adjusted by Fidesz to\nkeep its hold on power.[xx] <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In Armenia\u2019s case, there is a possibility to adopt a new\nconstitution by a referendum, and in addition to that, Pashinyan\u2019s My Step bloc\nwon a two-third parliamentary majority, therefore the government does not face\nthe dilemma noted by Heged\u0171s. Condemning the state capture by the National\nAssembly, implementation of transitional justice, constitutional and judiciary\nreforms, a reform of the election system, adoption of some laws (most essentially,\na law against illegal enrichment and a law stipulating transparency of media\nownership) and some other measures are crucial for securing the Velvet\nRevolution\u2019s democratic achievements. The government\u2019s reluctance to implement\nsuch measures quickly, repeated statements about having a preference for slow\nreforms, as well as focusing on a number of trivial issues in the first months\nafter the snap elections in December 2018, are quite upsetting. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The international context: Are double standards\njustifiable? <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Considering the numerous similarities between the situation\nin Armenia before the Velvet Revolution and in Hungary, it may be worth to\nconclude by comparing the international attitudes towards the two cases. As a\nnumber of publications show, there has been strong disappointment among western\npolicymakers and media, and their frustration is understandable as a NATO and\nEuropean Union member country may be turning into an autocracy. However,\nsimilar \u2013 or even worse \u2013 tendencies in other countries sometimes have often\nbeen neglected. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Certainly, Armenia\u2019s former leaders did not have access to\nEuropean funds in the same way Orb\u00e1n\u2019s entourage does. Yet, that obviously does\nnot mean that wide-scale voting fraud, corruption, and ultimately state capture\nembedded in the constitution did not matter in the Armenian case. Yet, Western\npolicymakers and pundits hardly criticized the constitutional reform of 2015\nsimilarly to the way they have been criticizing Orb\u00e1n\u2019s manipulation of the\nHungarian constitution. In fact, rather sympathetic accounts were easier to\nfind. For example, Carnegie Europe senior fellow Thomas de Waal admitted:\n\u201cNothing will change. Indeed, the presidential administration building where\nSargsyan works will become the prime minister\u2019s office, with merely a different\nnameplate on the door. \u2026 Obviously, this is a mechanism that allows Armenia\u2019s\ncurrent ruling elite to stay in charge. It\u2019s a familiar tactic in the\npost-Soviet space, where leaders endlessly tinker with their constitutions to\nperpetuate their power,\u201d yet also argued that \u201cthe new configuration and its\ndivision of powers could work better for Armenia than the old one\u201d[xxi] (i.e.\nthe parliamentary system versus the presidential one), and even praised some of\nSargsyan\u2019s policies. In turn, policymakers\u2019 approach might be summarized by a\nremark made by the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign\nAffairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini, soon after the adoption of the\nconstitutional amendments: Armenia, she argued, was \u201cconsolidating fragile\ndemocracy.\u201d[xxii] <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The long-term devotion to the notion of positive\nreinforcement, with preference given to praising small improvements instead of\ncriticizing major flaws, did not help to advance democracy and good governance\nin Armenia. Particularly, double standards involving generous indulgence\ntowards the former Armenian leadership corrupted the image of the West and of\nits normative values among a large segment of Armenia\u2019s population. On the\nother side, while the West is, quite understandably, mostly preoccupied with\nthe deterioration of democratic standards and corruption within, endorsing\ncorrupt politicians outside is hardly a feasible policy. It seems possible to\nafford neglecting the processes going on in a small country lost somewhere between\nRussia and the Middle East. Yet, the earlier neglect of some processes in a\nsmall peripheral country heavily influenced by Russia \u2013 the principal exporter\nof \u201cilliberalism\u201d \u2013 might have allowed fine-tuning of dubious methods which\ncould later be used by other autocrats to corrupt even once exemplary\ntransitional countries. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this context, it is also remarkable that then-president\nSargsyan\u2019s overnight decision not to sign the EU-Armenia Association Agreement\nin 2013 and to join the Russia-centered Customs Union instead was considered by\nthe majority of European, American, and other experts as a rather natural\nextension of traditional pro-Russian policy; there were shortsighted\nsuggestions that after receiving Armenia as a little prize Vladimir Putin would\nnot create further obstacles for other countries\u2019 association with the EU. Rare\nwarnings that serious troubles in the EU\u2019s Eastern Neighborhood would follow\nsoon were not paid enough attention. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

It may be worth writing a book resembling B\u00e1lint Magyar\u2019s\nremarkable piece on Hungary sometimes, covering the Armenian case of\npost-communist mafia state created in the two decades before the Velvet\nRevolution. More parallels could be drawn with the Hungarian and some other\ncases. However, that kind of academic publication would better be postponed:\nfocusing on current policy analysis seems more necessary at the moment, as on\nthe one side Armenia has a unique chance to democratize, but on the other side,\nthe former regime\u2019s remaining control of the judiciary and other institutions,\nsupplemented by propaganda and other \u201chybrid war\u201d instruments and driven by\nhuge financial and media resources, is being used for making a restoration of\nthe mafia state possible. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

The transition period ahead is not going to be an easy one,\nand it requires determined and precise actions by the government and civil\nsociety. And while the principal job has to be done by the Armenians, other\nactors interested in Armenia\u2019s successful democratic transition may also decide\nupon the amount of attention worth paying to the ongoing processes.   <\/p>\n\n\n\n

References<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

 [i] Armen Ashotyan\u2019s\nFacebook post, May 30, 2019. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[ii] Armen Grigoryan, \u201cArmenia first\u201d: Analysing Armenia\u2019s\ngrowing alt-right scene.\u201d Open Democracy, 2019. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[iii] Ibid. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[iv] Armen Grigoryan, \u201cProtesters in Armenia demand snap\nparliamentary elections and Prime Minister Sargsyan resigns.\u201d Eurasia Daily\nMonitor, April 23, 2018. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[v] Patrick Kingsley, \u201cAs West fears the rise of autocrats,\nHungary shows what\u2019s possible.\u201d New York Times, February 10, 2018. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[vi] D\u00e1niel Heged\u0171s, \u201cHungarian politics is about to enter a\nnew period \u2014 no matter who wins the elections.\u201d GMFUS, April 5, 2018. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[vii] Bal\u00e1zs Jar\u00e1bik, \u201cViktor Orb\u00e1n\u2019s survival games.\u201d\nCarnegie Europe, April 10, 2018. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[viii] Lili Bayer, \u201cViktor Orb\u00e1n courts voters beyond\n\u2018fortress Hungary\u2019.\u201d Politico.eu, August 22, 2017. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[ix] Rozi Bazsofy and Elliott Goat, \u201cFresh evidence of\nHungary vote-rigging raises concerns of fraud in European elections.\u201d Open\nDemocracy, May 17, 2019. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[x] Zoltan Simon, \u201cOrban\u2019s ominous threat pushes Hungary\nopposition to start talks.\u201d Bloomberg, March 19, 2018. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[xi] Jan-Werner M\u00fcller, \u201c\u2018Democracy\u2019 still matters.\u201d New York\nTimes, April 5, 2018. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[xii] D\u00e1niel Heged\u0171s, op. cit. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[xiii] Budapest Business Journal, January 2, 2019. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[xiv] B\u00e1lint Magyar, Post-communist mafia state: The case of\nHungary. Budapest: CEU Press, 2016, p. 90. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[xv] Neil Buckley and Andrew Byrne, \u201cViktor Orban\u2019s\noligarchs: a new elite emerges in Hungary.\u201d Financial Times, December 21, 2017.\n<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[xvi] B\u00e1lint Magyar, op. cit., p. 97. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[xvii] B\u00e1lint Magyar, op. cit., p. 81. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[xviii] Deutsche Welle, \u201cHungary PM Viktor Orban aims to\nmilitarize the school system.\u201d August 14, 2017. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[xix] Armen Grigoryan, \u201cRegime change is on the agenda\u201d (in\nArmenian). Zhamanak, June 13, 2008. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[xx] D\u00e1niel Heged\u0171s, op. cit. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[xxi] Thomas de Waal, \u201cWill Armenia\u2019s transition bring\nchange?\u201d Carnegie Europe, April 5, 2018. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

[xxii] Federica Mogherini, \u201cReturning from Azerbaijan and Armenia.\u201d March 2, 2016.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The paper was originally published on www.aravot-en.am <\/a><\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n


Armen Grigoryan<\/a> is an EDSN fellow and a policy adviser for several Armenian non-governmental organizations.


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By\u00a0Armen Grigoryan Introduction In 2012, when President Serzh Sargsyan suspended diplomatic relations with Hungary after the extradition of Ramil Safarov to Azerbaijan, most Armenians\u2019 perception that Hungary\u2019s Prime Minister Viktor Orb\u00e1n himself played an important, if not decisive role in the unfortunate decision to extradite the notorious axe-murderer, was quite accurate. It is a bit […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":214,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[7,4],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-673","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-blog","category-publications"],"yoast_head":"\nState Capture by Means of Constitution: Armenian and Hungarian Cases - Democratic Security Institute<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/?p=673\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"State Capture by Means of Constitution: Armenian and Hungarian Cases - Democratic Security Institute\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"By\u00a0Armen Grigoryan Introduction In 2012, when President Serzh Sargsyan suspended diplomatic relations with Hungary after the extradition of Ramil Safarov to Azerbaijan, most Armenians\u2019 perception that Hungary\u2019s Prime Minister Viktor Orb\u00e1n himself played an important, if not decisive role in the unfortunate decision to extradite the notorious axe-murderer, was quite accurate. 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