{"id":1353,"date":"2026-04-27T16:34:14","date_gmt":"2026-04-27T16:34:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/?p=1353"},"modified":"2026-04-28T05:36:19","modified_gmt":"2026-04-28T05:36:19","slug":"georgias-dilemma-bridge-or-bystander-to-regional-peace-and-security","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/?p=1353","title":{"rendered":"Georgia\u2019s Dilemma: Bridge or Bystander to Regional Peace and Security?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

By Medea Turashvili<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Georgia is facing an acute strategic dilemma as international and regional systems reshape, and domestic political pressures intensify. With growing divergence in the trans-Atlantic partnership and Great Power politics resurging, conventional assumptions of post-Cold War security are being undermined and Georgia finds itself in an increasingly precarious position. Russia \u2013 waging the war of aggression against Ukraine \u2013 continues to pose an existential threat to Georgian sovereignty, occupying approximately 20 percent of its territory and exerting malign influence on domestic politics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n

Simultaneously, internal political developments have undermined Georgia\u2019s ability and readiness to navigate shifting global dynamics. After the controversial 2024 parliamentary elections, the ruling Georgian Dream party damaged its relations with most of the country\u2019s strategic partners, drifting into a \u201cno man\u2019s land between the West and the Russia-cum-Brics world.\u201d [1] Georgians have taken to the streets in large-scale protests for over three years now, reflecting growing public opposition to its European isolation. Some critics argue that the government is deliberately isolating the country from its Western partners to consolidate power, drawing Georgia into Russia\u2019s sphere of influence [2].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The convergence of external uncertainty and internal instability has harmed Georgia\u2019s peace and security agenda and its international and regional standing, including its long-held transit identity. Reorienting toward Europe and democracy, addressing its protracted domestic political crisis, reducing dependence on Russia, and leveraging its geographic position in regional connectivity projects are essential if Georgia is to restore its strategic position in regional and global affairs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

External Pressures: Between Russia and the West<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

For over two decades, Georgia\u2019s foreign policy has rested on the assumption that deepening integration into the Euro-Atlantic framework would balance the threat of Russia, support Georgia’s socio-economic development, and advance Georgia\u2019s conflict resolution agenda in relation to its occupied territories \u2013 Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Accordingly, Georgia\u2019s foreign policy rested on two pillars. Firstly,a security alliance with the West, which has seen Georgia as a net contributor to Western security, exemplified by Georgia being the largest non-NATO troop contributor to Operation Iraqi Freedom and to the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan [3]. In exchange, the West provided Georgia with the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package (SNGP), which has played a pivotal role in helping Georgia build its defence capacity, strengthen its resilience, and promote Georgian integration into NATO. Furthermore, at the 2008 Bucharest Summit, NATO issued a political commitment to future membership for Georgia in line with their Euro-Atlantic aspirations [4]. The second pillar was a deepening partnership with the European Union to foster political, economic and social transformation with the long-term objective of accession. Article 78 of the Georgian Constitution states, \u201cthe constitutional bodies shall take all measures within the scope of their competencies to ensure the full integration of Georgia into the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization\u201d [5], reflecting the entrenchment of their Western orientation. EU integration was fast-tracked when the Ukraine war opened the opportunity for Georgia to be granted formal candidate status in 2023.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, what has taken decades to build has collapsed in months. Georgian Dream\u2019s foreign policy and democratic U-turn has fractured its relations with the US, EU and NATO, damaging Georgia\u2019s security and defense capabilities [6]. In 2024, the EU halted more than $30 million in funding earmarked for the Georgian defense system. NATO reviewed engagement with Georgia \u201cin light of the 2024 parliamentary elections and their aftermath\u201d.[7]<\/p>\n\n\n\n

At the same time, with the US’s weakened security commitments to Europe and Europe\u2019s emerging, yet inchoate security architecture, Georgia still lacks credible security guarantees to ensure its survival. Recent US administrations have also made clear a reduced appetite for NATO expansion, while the Trump administration is characterized by a retreat from multilateral institutions. The new US National Security Strategy emphasizes that Europe must shoulder greater responsibility for its own security, amp up its financial role in NATO and reduce their reliance on the implicit understanding of US security guarantees.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In this recalibration, the European bloc is scrambling to develop its own security agenda in response to the transatlantic relational crisis but the shape and timeline of this infrastructure is uncertain. Furthermore, Europe\u2019s capacity in the immediate or near future to construct a security architecture which offers Georgia meaningful and credible protection under its protective umbrella remains equally uncertain. Present geopolitical tensions thus leaves Georgia on the fault line between the European and Russian spheres of influence, with Europe\u2019s defense and deterrence capabilities remaining nascent, and Russia being irrevocably revisionist.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In the absence of credible security guarantees, Georgia has consistently relied on longstanding norms of international law and multilateralism as mechanisms to amplify its voice, ensure diplomatic support, and constrain Russian influence. Yet, with the US skepticism towards multilateral institutions and international law, eroding trust among transatlantic allies, and the return of \u201cmight-makes-right\u201d geopolitics, the protective framework once offered by NATO as well as the demise of soft deterring powers of the UN, OSCE and other multilateral institutions, Georgia\u2019s ability to realize its Euro-Atlantic vision remains weakened. Without the security guarantees and diplomatic support of major allies, the end result for Tbilisi is a return to Russia\u2019s orbit of influence and subjugation to the Kremlin\u2019s whims.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Domestic Political Polarization as a Foreign Policy Constraint<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Alongside geopolitical challenges, domestic political instability adds to the challenge in Georgia. Despite formal ambitions to embrace European values and norms, the democratic trajectory of Tbilisi has not been linear. Particularly since 2020, Georgian Dream has accelerated its authoritarian consolidation of power by, \u201c the dismantling of executive power checks and balances, closing space for media freedom, targeting the civil society sector, human rights violations and declining judicial independence,\u201d [8]. In weakening Georgia\u2019s democratic features, including institutional checks and balances on political power, Georgian Dream has undermined Georgia\u2019s ambitions for democratic transition and tarnished its international reputation. Georgian Dream\u2019s pursuit of domestic autocratization has eroded the country\u2019s credibility and their foreign policy partnerships.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The controversial 2024 electoral victory of Georgian Dream underscores the increasingly autocratic nature of the party, with the electoral process shrouded by credible concerns of electoral manipulation, including ballot stuffing, voter intimidation and polling station violence [9]. The passage of the Russian-inspired \u201cforeign agents\u201d law compounded the erosion of institutional legitimacy. The law, which brands charities, pressure groups, and opposition groups receiving funding from overseas as agents of foreign influence, has largely been seen as an attempt by the ruling Georgian Dream party to quell internal dissent and suffocate opposition. Its passing is emblematic of Georgia\u2019s broader political struggle between democratic transition and residual authoritarian legacies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

While the Georgian Dream party\u2019s grip on power appears consolidated, it still remains on a shaky ground. Georgia has seen a significant downward trend in public approval of public institutions. Public trust in the government has collapsed, and it stands at 18%, according to a recent survey; a mere 7% trust politicians, 14% trust bureaucracy and institutions. Only 11% of Georgians expressed satisfaction with the state of democracy and many considered the state an institution of patronage for the political elite, rather than a guarantor of rights [10].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The drastic and rapid autocratization reveals a fundamental flaw in Georgia\u2019s democratization agenda. Rather than dismantling an entrenched and unequal political, social and economic power structures and cultivating a genuine collective agency or popular power, democratization was reduced to the process of performative state institution-building pursued by political elites, often with international support. The result is the public institutions that entangle formal and informal rule, creating neo-patrimonial structures which benefit the few, narrow elite at the expense of broader societal interests.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Taken together, these internal dynamics point to a foreign policy increasingly constrained by domestic instability. Political polarization, contested legitimacy, and authoritarian legislation have weakened institutional capacities, eroded societal cohesion and undermined Georgian Dream\u2019s credibility both internally and among international partners. Georgian Dream party\u2019s democratic U-turn and unresolved political crisis has left the country internationally and regionally marginalized: the EU has effectively suspended Georgia’ s EU integration process and downgraded political contacts; bilateral partnerships with important European players such as Germany, France, Poland, Baltic states and the UK are damaged; The EU has suspended visa-free travel for senior Georgian officials in response to \u201cGeorgia\u2019s deliberate and persisting violation of the commitments taken under its visa-free regime in key areas of democracy and fundamental rights\u201d [11].; the US engagement in the South Caucasus now largely bypasses Georgia, and so on.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Turning Away from Europe, Hopes on Newfound Friends?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The consequences of internal instability are increasingly visible on the international stage. The EU has criticized the Georgian government\u2019s attempt to suffocate domestic opposition, media and civil society, warning that the \u201cforeign agents\u201d law undermines the democratic standards required for Georgia\u2019s EU accession ambitions. The growing rift is also reflected in Georgia\u2019s declining alignment rate with EU statements and decisions on sanctions,down to 40% in 2025 from 53% in 2024 [12]. Foreign policy alignment, particularly on sanctions, is not simply a symbolic act: it is a demonstration of an EU candidate country’s strategic orientation and willingness to align with the EU\u2019s common foreign and security policies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Georgia\u2019s foreign policy has moved from an ardent commitment to Euro-Atlantic integration to almost open confrontation with the EU, with the government accusing unnamed \u2018forces\u2019 of orchestrating attempts to draw Georgia into a \u201csecond front\u201d with Russia. The government proxies are openly advocating for neutrality, claiming it will protect Georgian sovereignty. But its neutral position is one that fails to recognize that Georgia\u2019s core vulnerability is to be left alone with Russia, the existential threat to Georgia\u2019s peace and security. The isolation of Georgia from its European partners creates a vacuum for Russian influence to fill.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Additionally, Georgian Dream\u2019s \u201cGeorgia First\u201d foreign policy strategy is intended to prioritize \u201csovereignty\u201d and \u201cpragmatism\u201d. Failing to capture the sustained attention of US President Donald Trump, the party has pursued ties with new actors, such as Iran, the UAE, Central Asia and India. The expansion of relations with China \u2013 Georgia’s strategic partner since 2023 – includes trade, culture, purchase of surveillance systems, and cooperation between central banks [13]. In 2024, Georgia picked a Chinese-Singaporean consortium \u2013 a sole bidder, sanctioned during Donald Trump\u2019s first term\u2013 to build the strategically important Anaklia Deep Sea Port, a deal which would award the Chinese side a 49% stake in the facility, if finalized [14], although the contract is not yet signed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Arguably, the diversification of trading relationships is intended to benefit the Georgian economy. Yet, these newfound partnerships remain largely transactional and are unlikely to offset the structural influence of Russia, which continues to dominate significant sectors of the Georgian economy. As of 2024, Russia accounted for 66% of Georgia\u2019s wine exports, increasing from 55% in 2021 [15]. Georgia\u2019s export dependence is particularly high for several agricultural products; as of 2024, 94% of peach exports went to Russia; the share is 86% for cranberries, blueberries, and other berries. Russia\u2019s share in Georgia\u2019s oil product imports rose from 16.4% in 2021 to 40% by 2024 [16]. The asymmetric interdependence of Georgia on Russia for trade leaves it vulnerable to economic instrumentalization, whereby Russia transforms economic ties into mechanisms of political coercion. The weaponization of economic leverage is a proven tool in the Kremlin\u2019s foreign policy repertoire towards its neighbours.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Securing Peace and Connectivity: Georgia as a bridge or a bystander?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Georgia\u2019s growing distance from its Western, particularly European, partners and appeasement of Russia weaken its claims of territorial sovereignty, security and peace. Since Russia\u2019s invasion of Georgia in 2008, Moscow\u2019s political, economic and military domination over occupied South Ossetia and Abkhazia has dramatically increased. Since the war, Tbilisi has pursued a policy of non-recognition and engagement with its regions \u2013 a strategy supported by its Western partners. This allowed Georgia to focus on conflict prevention, normalization of relationships, people-to-peaple contacts between divided communities and conflict transformation. However, as relations with European partners deteriorate, Georgia\u2019s peace policy is also stalled [17].<\/p>\n\n\n\n

For decades, the European Union and its member states have been actively involved in conflict prevention, transformation, and resolution processes in Georgia. They have supported formal negotiation formats, ceasefire monitoring, dialogue and confidence-building initiatives between conflict-divided societies, and projects focused on the socio-economic well-being of conflict-affected populations and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The EU integration process and Georgia\u2019s ultimate membership in the organization could potentially lead to a process of political and social transformation, likely having long-term effects on societal changes and the political will of de facto authorities. On a social level, the process of European integration and accession could foster a fundamental shift in values and behaviour \u2013 one that rejects violent conflict resolution, encourages a culture of dialogue and compromise, and establishes firm institutional guarantees for equality, human rights, and social justice. Even under the conditions of an unresolved conflict, trust, peaceful coexistence, cooperation, and reconciliation would have been possible between societies divided by conflict. Regarding the shift in the political will and calculations of the de facto authorities, the European integration process should be viewed as an opportunity to transform the parties’ motives and even their perception of the conflict, including the dynamics and structure of their relations with Russia [18]. Despite the policy of non-recognition, the EU\u2019s approach toward the de facto authorities strives to be flexible and open, which creates opportunities for them to increase engagement and cooperation with the outside world. For de facto entities, particularly Abkhazia, this represents a chance to gradually liberate themselves from Russian military, economic, political, and cultural dominance. Notably, Russia\u2019s aggression against Ukraine has fuelled resentment and fear in Abkhazia toward such Russia that uses coercive force to maintain total control over the region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Diminishing the risks of Russia\u2019s annexation of Abkhazia (and South Ossetia), reducing the dominance of Russian capital there, expanding trade opportunities with the EU, preserving cultural identity, ending the region’s isolation, and ensuring its integration to the outside world are all shared Georgian and Abkhazian interests. These are the very issues that Georgia\u2019s EU integration and eventual membership could positively influence. Trade relations, cooperation in education and social spheres, and visa incentives could potentially alter the attitudes of both the Abkhazian public and its elites regarding the conflict and their relationship with Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Lastly, historically, Georgia has served as a host for diplomatic mediation and normalization talks amongst rivaling nations and has contributed to regional stabilization. In the current geopolitical climate, this role is becoming even more valuable. With renewed interest in the Middle Corridor \u2013 linking Europe to Central Asia via the South Caucasus \u2013 the strategic importance of the region has been elevated as Europe seeks to find alternative routes bypassing Russia and Iran. As disruptions to traditional energy and trade corridors continue, external actors \u2013 like the EU \u2013 are seeking reliable and politically stable transit partners. Georgia has an opportunity to benefit significantly by positioning itself as central to regional cooperation. Through enhanced cooperation with Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as with Turkey, Tbilisi can contribute to raising the strategic value of the South Caucasus as a whole, cultivating a predictable transit space that would attract long-term investment. These routes would generate not only economic benefits for Georgia but reinforcing a reputation as a regional facilitator and a critical link in emerging Eurasian supply chains. Yet, being a reliable transit actor requires a stable and predictable government in Tbilisi and restoring constructive partnerships with the US and the EU, as one-sided partnerships with the East risk Georgia\u2019s long-term ability to enhance its connectivity agenda.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Conclusion and Policy Suggestions<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

In conclusion, the combination of domestic instability and geopolitical reshuffling has rendered Georgia isolated and increasingly vulnerable to Russian interference. Geopolitically, the withdrawal of American support and the fracturing of the Euro-Atlantic alliance have left Georgia without its major political ally. Georgian Dream\u2019s abandonment of the European integration project has undermined its national security and regional relevance. Its internal instability and external isolation have become a mutually reinforcing dynamic that weakens the country\u2019s strategic position regionally and internationally.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Georgian Dream\u2019s policy of pivoting away from European integration is a strategic miscalculation that will levy a heavy toll on Georgia\u2019s peace initiatives, territorial integrity and regional positioning. This strategic drift leaves Georgia in a precarious position: it has no strategic allies and it is overexposed to Russia. Georgia must recalibrate its strategic outlook to reflect the newfound realities of an increasingly complex and competitive global order. While diversification of partnerships is necessary, it cannot come at the expense of strategic clarity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Georgia\u2019s foreign policy and security outlook now should rely on four fundamental factors. Firstly, it must reduce its economic dependence on Russia and implement strategies to combat Russian hybrid warfare. Secondly, Georgia must re-anchor itself into the European framework through prioritizing EU integration, restarting its process of accession and engaging in EU security discussions. Georgia needs to continue its commitment to European integration as a vital milestone for its foreign, security and peace policies. At the same time, Georgia has an opportunity to position itself as an active contributor in shaping the evolving security architecture of Europe. Thirdly, it must reassert its position as a regional diplomatic anchor. By working closely with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey, it must facilitate opportunities for enhanced economic connectivity, which would raise the strategic value of the region. Last but not least, Georgia should diversify not only its economic cooperations, but political and security partnerships, most importantly with the Black Sea states related to Black Sea security.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, most importantly, it is domestic strength that underpins the credibility of Georgia\u2019s foreign policy positions. For those four factors to work effectively, Georgia needs resilient democracy, respect for the rule of law, and governmental transparency and trust to be considered a legitimate partner for Europe, for its immediate neighbours in the South Caucasus and beyond. For a country like Georgia, the lack of democracy and lack of government\u2019s popular legitimacy is automatically translated into the lack of credibility and distrust towards the country in regional and international affairs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The future of Georgia\u2019s strategic standing is contingent upon a renewed social contract – one that restores the rights of civil society and demonstrates the government’s resolve in navigating the nation through the political crisis. Only through the mutually reinforcing processes of European reorientation and domestic democratic progress can Georgia restore its credibility, strategic role in regional affairs and confront its existential threat of Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Author: Medea Turashvili, Non Resident Fellow at Democratic Security Institute<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The author would like to express sincere gratitude to Grace Shipp, the DSI Intern, for her research assistance and dedication throughout the preparation of this article<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[1] The west needs to prepare for a crisis in Georgia<\/u><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[2] Georgian Dream Drifts From NATO And EU As Opposition Seeks Integration<\/u><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[3] Amid Georgian Regime’s Crackdown, U.S. Can Support Its People<\/u><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[4] A Decade of Progress: Marking 10 Years of the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package | NATO News<\/u><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[5] Constitution of Georgia<\/u><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[6] Georgian Dream policies damaging Tbilisi\u2019s national security \u2013 experts | Eurasianet<\/u><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[7] The Secretary General\u2019s Annual Report 2025, NATO<\/u><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[8] Trust and social cohesion in Georgia\u2019s path to Europe: Navigating democratic aspirations amid authoritarian drift, 2025<\/u><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[9] Georgia: OSCE ODIHR Election Observation Mission, Final Report<\/u><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[10] Trust and social cohesion in Georgia\u2019s path to Europe: Navigating democratic aspirations amid authoritarian drift, 2025<\/u><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[11] EU suspends visa-free travel for Georgian diplomats and officials over democratic backsliding<\/u><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[12] European Commision: COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT Georgia 2025 Report<\/u><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[13] Georgia\u2019s Turn Toward China\u2019s Financial System, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 2026<\/u><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[14] Georgia\u2019s PM: Anaklia port construction to resume in coming days – Georgia Today<\/u><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[15] Georgia\u2019s economy has become tied to Russia. Factcheck, 2025<\/u><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[16] ibid<\/p>\n\n\n\n

[17] Peace policy is dead. Beware the peace, Georgia!<\/u><\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n

[18] European Union as a Peace Project For Georgia. Social Justice Centre, 2024.<\/u><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

By Medea Turashvili Georgia is facing an acute strategic dilemma as international and regional systems reshape, and domestic political pressures intensify. With growing divergence in the trans-Atlantic partnership and Great Power politics resurging, conventional assumptions of post-Cold War security are being undermined and Georgia finds itself in an increasingly precarious position. Russia \u2013 waging the […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[4],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-1353","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-publications"],"yoast_head":"\nGeorgia\u2019s Dilemma: Bridge or Bystander to Regional Peace and Security? - Democratic Security Institute<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/?p=1353\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Georgia\u2019s Dilemma: Bridge or Bystander to Regional Peace and Security? - Democratic Security Institute\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"By Medea Turashvili Georgia is facing an acute strategic dilemma as international and regional systems reshape, and domestic political pressures intensify. 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With growing divergence in the trans-Atlantic partnership and Great Power politics resurging, conventional assumptions of post-Cold War security are being undermined and Georgia finds itself in an increasingly precarious position. Russia \u2013 waging the […]","og_url":"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/?p=1353","og_site_name":"Democratic Security Institute","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/profile.php?id=100088850526858","article_published_time":"2026-04-27T16:34:14+00:00","article_modified_time":"2026-04-28T05:36:19+00:00","author":"demsecinstitute","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@demsecinstitute","twitter_site":"@demsecinstitute","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"demsecinstitute","Est. reading time":"15 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/?p=1353#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/?p=1353"},"author":{"name":"demsecinstitute","@id":"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/#\/schema\/person\/152bec0207fcadfc3b09da892465859f"},"headline":"Georgia\u2019s Dilemma: Bridge or Bystander to Regional Peace and Security?","datePublished":"2026-04-27T16:34:14+00:00","dateModified":"2026-04-28T05:36:19+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/?p=1353"},"wordCount":3279,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/#organization"},"articleSection":["Publications"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/?p=1353#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/?p=1353","url":"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/?p=1353","name":"Georgia\u2019s Dilemma: Bridge or Bystander to Regional Peace and Security? - Democratic Security Institute","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/#website"},"datePublished":"2026-04-27T16:34:14+00:00","dateModified":"2026-04-28T05:36:19+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/?p=1353#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/?p=1353"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/?p=1353#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Georgia\u2019s Dilemma: Bridge or Bystander to Regional Peace and Security?"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/#website","url":"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/","name":"Democratic Security Institute","description":"","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/#organization"},"potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/#organization","name":"Democratic Security Institute","url":"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/03\/New-logo.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/03\/New-logo.jpg","width":700,"height":280,"caption":"Democratic Security Institute"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/profile.php?id=100088850526858","https:\/\/x.com\/demsecinstitute"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/#\/schema\/person\/152bec0207fcadfc3b09da892465859f","name":"demsecinstitute","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/83dcf5aaab5d7ec965720c4e9e8d116467168870eb5c82db2eade422eeca8032?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/83dcf5aaab5d7ec965720c4e9e8d116467168870eb5c82db2eade422eeca8032?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"demsecinstitute"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org"],"url":"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/?author=1"}]}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1353","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=1353"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1353\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1355,"href":"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1353\/revisions\/1355"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=1353"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=1353"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/demsecinstitute.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=1353"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}